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Editorial
The European Commission announced on 30 
September that it had submitted a proposal 
to the European Parliament and the Council 
to amend Market Access Regulation 1528 
providing Duty Free Quota Free to countries 
negotiating an EPA. The EC proposal would 
withdraw DFQF market access to those 
countries that are not deemed to have taken 
steps towards ratifying or implementing their 
interim EPA. See our special update on page 2. 
Aid for Trade (AfT) was put front and centre 
of the trade and development community’s 
agenda this summer with the Third Global 
Review of AfT taking place in Geneva in July. 
As the dust settles, TNI chose to highlight some 
of the findings and insights that emerged from 
the event. 
This month’s TNI features an exclusive interview 
with Pascal Lamy. He gives us his opinion and 
valuable insights on the AfT agenda and the 
Global review. We also ask him what the Doha 
impasse, the changing balance of power, the 
economic slowdown, and the proliferation of 
PTAs mean for the future of the multilateral 
trading system.  
TNI also features an interview with Dr. Ibrahim 
Assane Mayaki, CEO of the NEPAD agency. He 
explains what is being done – and how it is being 
done - in the context of the NEPAD and CAADP 
to promote regional integration, regional trade 
and agriculture. 
Deborah Barker from the WTO sets the stage 
for this issue, looking back at this year’s Global 
Review’s achievements, and outlines what lies 
ahead. 
Frank Lammersen paints then the picture 
emerging out of the 260 case stories submitted 
for the “Aid for Trade at a Glance” publication, 
released during the Third Global Review. 
Our third article comes from Richard 
Newfarmer of the International Growth 
Centre and Olivier Cadot from the University 
of Lausanne. It reminds us that the diversity 
of forms that AfT takes calls for evaluating its 
impact through multiple lenses, a “prism of 
approaches”. 
In a provocative article, Sheila Page from ODI 
argues that some type of AfT assistance poses 
serious problems of conflict of interests, and 
invites donor countries to work on their own 
policies in order to make them more friendly to 
developing country exports. She also notes some 
gaps in areas of AfT support. 
Rishabh Kumar Dhir presents the early findings 
of AfT country evaluations from Malawi and 
Mauritius. 
Continuing on the theme of measuring success 
and evaluating AfT, Claire Delpeuch, Patrick 
Messerlin and their colleagues deplore the lack 
of focus on the causality of projects in AfT 
evaluations. They suggest that every evaluation 
set clear ex-ante and ex-post quantifiable 
objectives to strengthen the measurement of AfT 
impact. 
Taking the case of Malawi, Jonathan Said, Senior 
Economist at Imani Development, makes a call for 
the private sector and development community 
to integrate each other’s “thinking” in order to 
make AfT work. 
Finally, Simon Itaye looks at the success stories in 
AfT and draws lessons for successful intervention, 
focusing on private sector participation. 
As always, TNI’s editorial team welcomes your 
feedback and ideas for contributions. Feel free 
to contact us at tni@ictsd.ch or tni@ecdpm.org. 
To subscribe electronically to TNI, please go to 
http://ictsd.org/news/tni/.
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Interview with Pascal Lamy, WTO Director General
TNI: At the Aid for Trade Global Review in July, 
you mentioned the need to work more on results-
based management, improved aid effectiveness, 
and mainstreaming Aid for Trade into countries’ 
development strategies. Can you elaborate on 
possible next steps for achieving these goals? 
 Aid for Trade covers about one-third of all official 
development assistance (ODA). Unsurprisingly, it 
faces broadly the same challenges as other areas of 
development assistance, be it health or social support.  
The added challenge in the area of Aid for Trade is that 
progress in, for example, export diversification or trade-
related infrastructure can take time and be less tangible 
short-term than for example building a school or clinic.  
Nevertheless, I still believe that paying attention to this 
trade dimension is an essential part of ensuring that 
developing countries are given the means to stand on 
their own feet and integrate into the global economy.  
More than that, I am of the view that this trade 
integration offers opportunities for economic growth, 
employment and poverty alleviation which would not 
otherwise exist.
Advancing the case for results based management and 
better aid effectiveness is about getting better both at 
making the case for mainstreaming and demonstrating 
the impact of public money. Given that it is WTO 
Members, multilateral development banks, international 
development organizations, NGOs and the private 
sector which are primarily engaged in this effort, the 
implementation of the Paris Principles will primarily 
fall on them. The WTO’s role is that of a monitoring 
function and our Global Reviews are a focal point for our 
monitoring – a function which we carry out jointly with 
the OECD.  Members are already meeting to discuss the 
elements they would like us to focus on in the run-up to 
the 4th Global Review in 2013.
 
The European Commission announced on 30 September that countries that have concluded an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the 
EU without having taken the steps to ratify and implement it will be withdrawn from the Market Access Regulation as of 1 January 2014 onward. 
Should these developing countries not ratify an EPA by this new deadline, they could potentially lose their free access to the EU market. 
This proposal is expected to add new momentum to the current state of EPA negotiations. As to date only 18 countries of the 36 in Africa and the 
Pacific that negotiated EPAs in 2007 have taken what the Commission calls “necessary steps” toward ratification.
Slow EPA progress spurs EU action
The EPAs were meant to provide for trade reciprocity, promote sustainable development, and further regional integration by encouraging African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries to enter the negotiations with the EU in regional groupings. Since the launch of EPA negotiations in 2002 – 
with 1 January 2008 being set as the deadline for bringing the EC-ACP trade regime into conformity with WTO rules- progress has been slower 
than expected, with only one full EPA being signed between the EC and the CARIFORUM in 2008. However the implementation process of the 
CARIFORUM-EC EPA seems to have stalled since then, a problem that has widely been blamed on insufficient institutional capacity.
EU regulation has provided DFQF access since 2008
With the expiration of the trade regime under the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement in 2008, the EU Market Access Regulation (MAR) 1528/2007 has been 
providing duty free quota free market (DFQF) access to the 36 ACP countries. The EU Market Access Regulation (MAR) requires these ACP countries to sign, 
ratify and implement their EPA “within a reasonable period of time.” Despite their development goals, over the years the conclusion of EPAs have been 
continuously delayed and have since become a source of tension between the EU and ACP countries, leaving the entire process in disarray as a result. 
ACP negotiating countries have traditionally been reluctant to join EPAs for fear of the damaging effects of increased market competition from EU imports, 
especially in sensitive areas like agriculture and services. So far the ACP countries that have not concluded an interim EPA have not experienced any trade 
disruptions, as they have been able to fall back either on the “Everything But Arms” (EBA) regime or the standard EU Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSP). 
The EC’s explanation of its new proposal states that the MAR was always meant to be a “temporary solution and not a permanent facility.” According to 
the EU this decision aims to realign the ACP-EU trade relations so that they conform to WTO rules, while simultaneously preserving balance and fairness 
towards other ACP and non-ACP developing countries.
Implications for affected ACP countries
Of the 36 ACP countries that benefit from the Market Access Regulation, 18 island countries - Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Papua New Guinea, and 
14 Caribbean countries - have taken the necessary steps toward ratification and initialled agreements. These countries will continue to enjoy a duty free 
quota free market access to the EU, as they have in the past. However the situation becomes more critical for the other 18 countries that have not signed 
their agreements or are still not applying it. These countries would need to take the “necessary steps” toward ratification of existing EPAs or conclude new 
regional agreements with the EU. Alternatively, countries that still decide to opt out of EPAs will face a variety of different situations, depending on their 
existing arrangements with the 27-member EU bloc. Nine LDCs - Burundi, the Comoros, Haiti, Lesotho, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Zambia - will continue benefiting from DFQF access to the EU under the EBA scheme. Seven low income or lower middle income countries - Cameroon, 
Fiji, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Swaziland, Zimbabwe -  could still benefit from the GSP regime, which is also scheduled for reform in 2014. Finally, the last 
two countries, Botswana and Namibia - which are currently classified as upper middle income countries as per the World Bank’s gross national income per 
capita ranking - would no longer benefit from any preferences if their upper middle income status is maintained after the new EU GSP comes into force in 
2014.
Risks of rushing EPA talks
Rushed decisions to conclude EPA negotiations could seriously undermine regional integration, observers fear, as well as trigger negative development 
effects. Indeed, all countries within a same region are not likely to share a common position with regards to the conclusion of an EPA with the EU, due to 
varying levels of economic growth and development. Effective implementation might also become difficult if some countries endorse an EPA agenda for 
fear of trade disruption rather than development strategy considerations. 
Meanwhile, emerging players such as China, India, and Brazil have changed the stakes of the game by presenting themselves to these countries as 
alternatives to the EU, and with fewer conditions attached. The growing engagement of these emerging economies in Africa, for instance, is already 
changing the landscape for development by bringing in investment, development finance, and new trade prospects. (See TNI special issue this topic, 
Vol10-3, May 2011)  
More information
The main features of the Proposal are available here.
Related articles can be found on  the ECDPM Talking Point Blog “EPA Negotiations: The honeymoon is over…”; in Trade Negotiations Insights,  
“Riding out the storm: Will the EPAs sink?“; and “Losing old friends: The risk of an EPA backlash” by I. Ramdoo and S.Bilal. Additional 
background information can be found at the following website.
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Special update: European Commission puts 
renewed pressure on EPA negotiations.
TNI: You mentioned at the Global Review the 
connection between finding a positive outcome 
of the Doha Round and the effectiveness of 
Aid for Trade. If the Doha Round does not get 
resolved in the near future, how can the Aid for 
Trade Initiative work around it? What limitations 
does the Doha situation impose on Aid for Trade’s 
potential for continued success?
Since the Initiative was launched in 2005, Members 
were always keen to highlight that Aid for Trade was 
not dependent on a successful conclusion of the DDA.  
Impasse in the DDA has not equated with a blockage 
in Aid for Trade.  Indeed, the volume of Aid for Trade 
has grown by 60% in real terms since 2005 to reach 
approximately US$41 billion in 2009. 
That said, it is clear that Aid for Trade will be integral to 
implementing a final DDA agreement.  The complexity 
of the DDA negotiations is one reason for the difficulty 
we face in bringing them to a conclusion; it is also a 
reason why Aid-for-Trade support will be an integral 
part of supporting the implementation of a deal.  This 
is already clear for trade facilitation. In comparison 
with such capital intensive activities as investing in 
trade-related infrastructure like new ports, airports or 
roads, the sums involved are quite small – and depend 
to a large extent on political will for their achievement.  
However, these software investments are essential to 
get these big investments to work to their full potential. 
Indeed, one of the interesting elements to emerge 
from the Third Global Review was to see the way 
that these investments are being bundled up in such 
approaches as trade corridors, combining hard and soft 
components. In terms of the question of the limitation 
that Doha imposes, I would perhaps answer it the 
other way around.  That is how we can catch up with 
what is being achieved with Aid for Trade.  It’s clear that 
many Members are using Aid for Trade financing to 
implement reforms, e.g. customs modernization, which 
either implement or go beyond the commitments 
which are being discussed here in Geneva. 
TNI: You also mentioned the need to “make the 
case” that Aid for Trade can support broader 
policy objectives, such as social welfare, 
food security, climate change, and gender 
empowerment, among others. Could you 
elaborate on this further, in terms of what steps 
can be taken in that direction?
I think that United Nations Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-Moon set out the case eloquently at the Third 
Global Review.  He noted the interdependence of 
the international policy agenda.  For example, one 
cannot discuss food security without discussing climate 
change and vice versa.  Likewise, given that poverty 
is overwhelmingly a rural and female phenomenon, 
one cannot design sustainable food security solutions 
without taking gender empowerment seriously.  In our 
interconnected world, it is important that we do not 
consider these issues in silos, but instead consider the 
interdependence – breaking down what the Secretary-
General called the artificial barriers. For me a key part 
of the new work programme on Aid for Trade should 
look at “deepening coherence”.  Research submitted 
by the OECD for the Third Global Review showed 
the importance of complementary policies to achieve 
pro-poor outcomes from Aid for Trade support.  The 
same must also be true in the areas of food security, 
climate change, gender empowerment, etc.  I think 
we need to positively integrate these areas into our 
analysis. The central premise of Aid for Trade is the 
need to mainstream trade into development.  To ignore 
the impact which trade can have in these other areas 
would hardly be practicing what we preach!
TNI: The call for Aid for Trade case stories was 
successful, with a total of 274 case stories and 146 
self assessments submitted by partner countries. 
What are the key lessons learned from these 
stories? Do you think the methodology to get 
such information could be more systematic? 
The reaction to the call for case stories was particularly 
encouraging – and I admit somewhat unexpected in 
its number.  One of the key messages to come out of 
the 274 case stories which were submitted is the sheer 
volume and scope of the activities being implemented 
on the ground. The sectoral coverage and the type 
of projects funded was also rich in its diversity.  Given 
the volume of information generated, it is hard to 
generalize about the conclusions.  In-depth analysis 
of the case stories by region and by theme has been 
undertaken by the OECD, WTO and partners (notably 
UNECA, UNESCAP and the IADB).  That said, there 
are some common threads – such as ownership, 
alignment, sustained commitment, and political 
will – which stand out as essential for success.  As a 
collection, the case stories provide convincing evidence 
that Aid for Trade can and regularly does result in more 
trade, more employment, poverty alleviation - and 
often too in gender empowerment.  What it also 
highlights is that we need to get better at systematically 
measuring and tracking these outcomes over time.  
But the evidence that we have is already in my mind 
sufficient for us to be able to say with confidence 
that Aid for Trade is showing results.  That is not of 
course to say that we cannot do more and do better, 
particularly in terms of improving the methodology 
used to report results.
TNI: One of the major recurring themes at the 
Global Review was the need for increased private 
sector involvement. What role do you see for 
the private sector in the future? What challenges 
does this prospect bring? How could they be 
addressed? 
In addition to the 274 case stories, the World Bank 
conducted some outreach activities with the private 
sector. Two events were held in Paris and Washington 
to publicize a call for case stories from the private 
sector.  In total, the Bank received some 44 replies – 
replies which were compiled into a publication for the 
Third Global Review jointly with the WTO. 
The message which emerges is that the private sector 
is moving beyond corporate philanthropy as an add-
on to its corporate social responsibility agenda, but 
is increasingly viewing it as an essential component 
of its penetration of new markets.  Various examples 
were given at the Third Global Review of companies 
conducting capacity building efforts as part of their 
investments in new value chains.  Indeed, Walmart 
invited development agencies to work with it and others 
to help scale-up the important work in developing 
new suppliers in new markets.  Danone has set up a 
special “Ecosystem” fund to improve its operations by 
connecting better with local economic and social fabrics. 
There are obvious attractions from a development 
perspective to go down this route.  Such multinational 
enterprises offer the attraction of scale and market. The 
obvious challenge is, from a competition perspective, to 
ensure that working with such companies remains pro-
competitive i.e. that it’s in the public good, not to private 
advantage. This is as true in dealings with individual 
companies as it is in looking at which standards to use 
and support the adoption of in developing countries. 
The key point here is one of ownership. If the Aid for 
Trade project or programme is sufficiently owned by 
the recipient, these issues tend to fade away. Overall, I 
am keen to see the private sector engaged in all aspects 
of Aid for Trade; financing and implementation on the 
ground and cheerleading at the multilateral level for the 
need to ensure that mainstreaming results in a business-
friendly environment for local, regional and international 
investors.
TNI: Many have been critical of Aid for Trade 
because of the imbalances in Aid for Trade 
flows. Many LDCs are claiming that they are not 
receiving their due share of Aid for Trade funding, 
while just 20 countries, many of which are 
emerging economies, are receiving 50% of global 
Aid for Trade. Why does this imbalance still persist 
and how does the WTO intend to address it?   
One of the strengths of the Aid for Trade Initiative is 
the monitoring function, i.e. ensuring transparency.  
Through the Creditor Reporting System, the OECD 
has been able to establish a baseline against which to 
measure the progression of Aid for Trade expenditure 
year-on-year. The question ask you is predicated on 
the excellent work which the OECD does every year to 
bring transparency to these flows.  And here it should 
be remembered that the data only currently covers Aid 
for Trade from OECD reporters. Other South-South 
partners and corporate philanthropy are important 
sources of Aid for Trade flows, but are not captured in 
the flows. It is not just Least-Developed Countries that 
claim they are not receiving their fair share. It is a view 
held by many groups, not least the Small Vulnerable 
Economies.  Additionality was, and still remains, an 
important component of the Aid for Trade Initiative.  
We have been able to show that the additional 
resources made available have not been at the expense 
of other sources of aid.  And our latest joint report, 
“Aid for Trade at a Glance 2011: Showing Results”, 
highlights that the distribution is less concentrated – 
with the top 20 recipients receiving 50% of Aid for 
Trade.  Furthermore, in 2009, low income countries 
received 49% of Aid for Trade resources, as compared 
with 39% in 2008.  Among the middle income 
countries, the fall in concessional financing was against 
the backdrop of a more than doubling in the amount 
of non-concessional financing made available as a 
result of the crisis – from US$23.8 billion to US$50.5 
billion.  The next report from the OECD on Aid for 
Trade flows will be made available in Spring next year 
and cover the year 2010. It will help confirm if these 
are short-term, perhaps linked to the crisis, or longer 
term trends – reflecting the role of the G20. Over and 
above this joint monitoring work with the OECD, two 
practical steps which the WTO can play in this regard 
are through the strengthening of the analysis of Aid for 
Trade as part of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 
something which began in 2009, and by playing our 
part in the Enhanced Integrated Framework.  One very 
pleasing conclusion of the Third Global Review is that 
the EIF is starting to live up to its potential. 
TNI: In this rapidly evolving world, concluding 
WTO negotiating rounds has taken longer and 
longer. What kind of institutional reforms would 
be required to allow the multilateral system be 
more responsive to new realities, such as climate 
change and other “21st century issues”?
Your question correctly implies that there are 
constraints which have made agreement in the Doha 
round elusive. First there is the complexity of the 
negotiations. There are roughly 20 topics bundled 
together. Then there is the consensus principle which 
means that none of our 153 members can object. And 
finally a deal needs to be supported by 153 members. 
It is therefore not surprising that governance in the 
WTO takes longer than at national or even regional 
level. I do not believe, nevertheless, that the WTO is in 
3Issue 7 | Volume 10 | October 2011
need of an institutional reform of the type that we have 
seen at the WB or IMF recently. Addressing issues in the 
WTO does not require in my view institutional changes. 
What it requires is first to make the case for the issue, 
to look at how that particular issue interfaces with 
the trading system. Once this has been explored, the 
question before Members is whether or not the existing 
multilateral rules need to be modified or upgraded, if 
at all. But again, the first step is a better understanding 
of the intersection between the particular issue and the 
trading system, which unsurprisingly raises domestic 
constituency interests.
TNI: Continued failure to complete the WTO’s 
Doha Round trade talks could have strong 
negative impacts on the multilateral trading 
system. What concrete steps could be taken to 
instill new momentum in the negotiations?
WTO members are conscious that the way we have 
been doing things until now has not delivered the 
expected results. We are at an impasse. This is why new 
approaches need to be explored.  Members have tried 
to conclude a big package and it has not worked. They 
have also tried to do a small package and it has not 
worked either. Maybe it is time to test the possibility 
of moving the negotiations forward in areas where 
consensus exists among Members while working to 
deliver on the entire agenda at a later stage. In a way 
it is to move into a pragmatic way to delivering the 
results that the stakeholders of the system expect. One 
things is for sure, I do not believe we can stand still. The 
bicycle needs to keep moving forward. If it cannot be 
done in big steps, let’s try in smaller steps.
TNI: In the context of the current economic crises 
in the US and the EU, and increasing competition 
from emerging economies, developed countries 
might be tempted to adopt a protectionist 
stance. Do you fear these circumstances might 
have an impact on the already drawn-out Doha 
negotiations? How can the multilateral system 
best respond to these challenges?
 DG: What is impressive is that WTO members, 
developed and developing, have largely resisted 
strong pressure to adopt protectionist measures. Our 
regular monitoring reports have so far  shown that 
trade restrictive measures have affected a limited 
part of world trade. But, over the past six months, 
we have spotted some worrying developments. To 
turn to protectionist trade measures in the current 
circumstances would be a huge mistake. Because 
protectionism does not protect. But it can trigger a 
spiral of tit for tat measures in which every Member 
would lose.  But while members agree that the trading 
system has worked during the crisis, many have also 
asked, so why fix it? In a way the system is being the 
victim of its own success.
TNI: With the increase in active Preferential 
Trading Arrangements over the years and their 
deepened coverage over time beyond traditional 
tariff cuts, what can the WTO concretely do to 
prevent tensions developing between PTAs and 
the multilateral trading system?
It is true that PTAs have increased four-fold over the 
past 20 years or so to the roughly 300 that are active 
today. But what is interesting about this proliferation is 
that the more such agreements we have in place, the 
less each of them provides for the countries involved 
in terms of preferences. If you give preferences to 
everyone, you are actually extending this preferential 
treatment to no one. Moreover, only about one-
third of really high tariffs – those over 15% – are 
brought down through PTAs. Which means that such 
agreements largely cover tariffs which are already 
low and where a preference may not provide much 
of an advantage. Our economists estimate that the 
preferences generated by these agreements are truly 
meaningful only for about 13% of world trade flows.  
What is clear as well is that these PTAs are not always 
being used. Studies have shown that in Asia only about 
a quarter of firms surveyed took advantage of these 
preferences while in Latin America the figure was 
smaller still, about 20%. Where we do see a risk of 
divergences is on the regulatory side of the equation. 
Many PTAs today go beyond WTO rules in terms of the 
regulatory commitments they introduce. Whether we 
are talking about competition policy, technical barriers 
to trade, services, intellectual property or investment 
measures, these rules are, in many cases, deeper and 
wider than what we see in the WTO. And these rules 
and commitments vary with every agreement creating 
additional complexity for business. The first step is 
therefore to better understand the content of these 
PTAs, the elements of convergence and of divergence, 
with a view to equipping Members with a tool to then 
be able to address it effectively.
Interview with Ibrahim Assane Mayaki, Chief 
Executive Officer of the NEPAD agency 
TNI: How should Aid for Trade (AfT) be used in 
order to further Africa’s growth, development 
and participation in the global economy in the 
most effective way?
I think that first of all, ideologically, trade is like war: you 
go in the pursuit of conquering territories, almost in 
the same logic as you do in war, but you use different 
types of arms. If you assume that trade is like war, then 
the issue of providing aid to a potential competitor 
becomes a critical and interesting issue. The agenda 
of AfT as it has developed in the last years has been 
mainly embedded in development thinking and 
practice. In that sense it really provides instruments 
which can help to see trade as an instrument for 
development. 
It is in this regard that the issue of capacity becomes 
important: capacity at the national level, and at the 
regional level. Capacity goes beyond being able to 
negotiate in global conferences, it is the capacity to 
produce, to meet quality standards, the capacity to 
have an efficient private sector, the capacity to have a 
state providing an enabling environment for the private 
sector to perform, the capacity to have policymakers 
understand what trade is about and how we can fit in 
this context. 
In that sense aid for trade really makes sense and in 
the last years some progress has been made. The role 
of Pascal Lamy should be recognized as a key actor in 
that process.
 
TNI: Countries and regions in Africa have put a 
great emphasis on AfT as a means to mobilise 
additional resources. How do you reconcile this 
high level of expectations and the fact that 
disbursement rates have, in some countries, been 
low? 
Let us contextualise this question. In the last 15 years 
the statistics show that on a population of about 900 
million, about 500 million Africans, roughly, live in 
countries where domestic resources are ten times more 
important than aid. The numbers of Africans that live 
in countries where aid is more important than domestic 
resources is 60 million. 
The figures have evolved for three reasons: good 
macroeconomic polices, better governance, 
accountability, democratic intensity and so on. That has 
allowed a better mobilisation of domestic resources. 
Therefore the AfT architecture has to be looked at in 
terms of African themselves putting more money in the 
AfT logic and instruments. 
TNI: What is NEPAD’s strategy to overcome the 
bottlenecks to Regional Integration (RI) in Africa?
RI is a process that will be slow and that will have to 
show concrete results in terms of regional polices. To 
make the story short, there are issues and subjects 
that cannot be dealt with nationally in an optimal way. 
Policymakers need to understand that, and l believe 
they do. In the issue of energy and power they do 
absolutely understand it. The power cuts in Africa cost  
 
us fifty-six days of power during the year, two points 
of economic growth. We will not be able to tackle this 
issue if it is not done at the regional level.
The role of NEPAD is to facilitate, with its new mandate, 
the implementation of regional programmes and 
projects in transport, in power, in energy, in agriculture 
and so on, and make policymakers understand the 
necessity to have regional programmes on these issues. 
We then facilitate their implementation.
This means that we work closely with the Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs) in order to work on 
good feasibility studies, on bankable projects, on the 
capacity to mobilize resources on bankable projects, 
open to the private sector. We know that Africa has a 
lot of capacity problems in the domain of elaborating 
bankable projects, so we need to strengthen that. 
TNI: What do you think governments should do in 
Africa in order for small-scale producers to benefit 
from regional integration? 
This is a tough question! It is now admitted that we 
should aim for regional agriculture policies that will 
help us build regional markets. Demand is now at 
the regional levels. Agriculture and food products are 
exchanged across the borders of our countries. Trade 
preceded the political integration. The food security 
issue is no longer national but regional. It has taken 
a long time to admit that. But now, at the last G 20 
agriculture ministers meeting, it was proposed, by the 
G 20 experts to have regional food reserve systems.  
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ECOWAS is a pilot region in this regard: it has already 
started working on the interconnection of national 
food reserve systems and the creation of a model that 
will allow for the creation of a regional food reserve 
system in order to solve food security issues through 
regional means. I think that we have progressed a lot. 
At another level, in relations to the small farmers, I 
think there are some issue that have to be highlighted. 
The issue of price guarantees, at the level of agricultural 
producers, has to be looked at not only on a national 
basis if we aim at constructing regional markets. Let 
us not forget that, and we are doing that in CAADP, 
we have a kind of public sector thinking. But at the 
end of the day we need people who produce. And 
these people are the farmers. These people have to 
be supported, and in order to do that we need to 
work at the regional level and take advantage of the 
complementarities of our agro-ecological conditions. 
TNI: Donor support to agriculture has perhaps not 
been very effective in the past. What is needed in 
your own opinion, to make a difference this time 
around? 
I am not saying that the role of donors has been 
negative. I am saying that there have been negative 
aspects and positive aspects. But that debate is over 
because Africa should count more on its domestic 
resources. We are the continent with the highest 
density of natural resources, and we are also the 
poorest continent. Governance-wise things have to be 
looked at. 
We in NEPAD are coordinating the African position 
on the road to Busan. Our position is that what is 
important is development effectiveness. If you want to 
increase development effectiveness you should work 
on capacity. And in order to work on capacity we need 
to develop south-south cooperation. So we take the 
best practices from the south, Brazil, Colombia, China, 
Malaysia, etc. This is our position: we should focus 
much more on mobilising domestic resources and 
recuperate our planning concepts and implementation. 
Let me give you an example: agriculture. In some 
cases in the implementation of CAADP, national policy 
makers were thinking that the use of the CAADP 
process to get to the compact and to the national plan 
was going to serve donor money mobilisation. They did 
not really own the process. They said: “we will do the 
process because we will get money from somewhere”. 
That thinking is wrong.
So this is why whenever we go in countries, in the 
CAADP process, we say: “first of all count on your 
domestic resources and increase what you invest 
in agriculture”. Secondly, donors funding is highly 
welcome, but it has to feed into your strategy. This is 
what development effectiveness is all about.
 
TNI: How is strengthening the coordination 
between the implementation of the CAADP 
and the other regional programmes (such as 
AfT support to trade corridors) possible? How 
is NEPAD supporting the RECs to ensure these 
synergies are capitalised upon?
This is a challenge because agriculture is a multi-sectoral 
domain. Most of the development challenges are multi-
sectoral, but we are not organisationally structured to 
face that multisectorality: we keep planning and doing 
policies per sector. We in NEPAD are conscious of this 
and we fight it in several ways.
First of all, the idea of planning, of comprehensive 
planning, has to come back - and it is coming back 
- in the development agenda. In the 60’s we had 
some incipient planning processes in place after 
independence, but planning processes were totally 
erased with structural adjustment programmes and 
we started thinking in terms of donor priorities. This 
is why agriculture was not a priority in more than 20 
years: because were we not planning, or were planning 
sectorally according to donor needs and donor 
priorities. 
The second issue is the capacity of RECs: the 
institutional, intrinsic, capacity has to be up-scaled 
and enhanced. We have RECs where capacity is being 
built, ECOWAS and COMESA are good examples, but 
in others it has to be strengthened. By strengthening 
the intrinsic institutional capacity we will be able to 
coordinate apparently conflicting issues. This is still a 
challenge in NEPAD. We are re-enforcing our capacity 
to monitor and evaluate, and that will be key on the 
implementation of CAADP. We should remember 
that up to now we have been working on CAADP 
processes, but the real increments in agricultural 
productivity are still to be seen on the ground. 
TNI: How do you ensure that the relationship 
with the RECs runs smoothly, particularly when 
the NPCA works with countries?
The AUC’s role is to design the strategic continental 
framework; the RECs then implement this framework. 
So you have the policy design function, and the 
implementation function. Before the creation of NPCA 
you did not have anything between the AUC and the 
RECs. So the RECs might go in a way and the AUC 
might go in another way.(Might, I said might). The role 
of the NPCA is to make sure that these two wagons 
are linked. So this is why, in the example of CAADP, we 
are the ones who take CAADP to SADC and COMESA 
and work with them in order to regionalise it. During 
the delivery process we have to go to the country 
level and help the countries see what are the deficit at 
the country level which we can help compensate by 
working together. 
I have talked about the theory. We have to make this 
new mandate very well understood at the REC level. It 
is not always easy, because sometimes confusion can 
happen on the verb “implement”. We don’t want to 
be seen as implementing and that has to be very well 
understood at the level of RECs. And we cannot do 
that by just sending memos.
TNI: ECOWAS is the region that has made most 
progress in the context of regional compact while 
the others are lagging behind. Why is that? On 
the other hand you have COMESA, EAC and 
SADC, discussing a tripartite FTA. In this context 
do you think a tripartite compact is feasible? 
I think that the idea is good because it could really 
boost agricultural development in the zone. Now we 
need to formally put in place the methodology that will 
allow us to attain that objective. 
What do I mean? Well, COMESA has done quite well 
in CAADP implementation, SADC less, but most of 
the countries in SADC which are in COMESA have 
finalised their compact. So it shows that something 
has to be done with SADC in order to enhance the 
implementation of CAADP in the countries which have 
no compact. If the common regional compact idea can 
help rationalise and give coherence to the development 
of the sector that would be wonderful.  
ECOWAS is an illustration of collective behaviour, not 
only in agriculture, but also in energy and in peace and 
security. ECOWAS is used to tackling difficult issues, 
the coup in Niger, the Cote d’Ivoire crisis, etc. The 
Conference of Agricultural Ministers has invested a lot 
in ECOWAP, the regional agricultural policy. They have 
put their own resources as a regional body in national 
plans: the political will has been very strong. 
TNI: You keep mentioning private sector and 
private sector involvement. What has been 
the degree of private sector involvement in 
CAADP so far, and do you expect private sector 
contributions to be substantial? 
First of all, we need to implicate them much more, 
in the design of the national investment plans of 
agriculture. Secondly, we need to provide the right 
information. Thirdly, we need to push towards the 
creation of an enabling environment in the countries. 
But most of all, in terms of mentality, policymakers 
have to see agriculture as a business, as profitable. 
The experiences that we see from Mozambique and 
Tanzania confirm this. 
It will be very critical for us, on a regional basis, to make 
sure that private capital comes into the agricultural 
sector. It is being done more and more. Nigeria, 
Tanzania, Mozambique, and Kenya are good examples. 
So we have best practices that can be shared, but it 
implies a change in the way policymakers think. This is 
because their main partner in developing that sector up 
until now has been the donor community. There needs 
to be a shift to the private sector community.
 
Box 1: The Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)
The AU assembly adopted CAADP in 2003 and its overall goal is to eliminate hunger and reduce poverty through agriculture. CAADP is entirely 
African-led and African-owned, and is a framework under which countries develop national and regional compacts and investment plans.  The 
focus of CAADP is improving food security, nutrition and increasing national incomes by raising agricultural productivity by at least 6 per cent 
per year and public investments in agriculture by 10 per cent of national budgets per year. CAADP is also promoting agricultural development 
by improving co-ordination, knowledge sharing and cooperation at the regional, national and continental level. As of May 2011, 26 countries 
had signed the compact and incorporated the CAADP Compact into their agricultural agenda. 8 member countries have reached the public 
investment goal of 10 per cent and 9 countries have reached the goal of a 6 per cent increase in agricultural productivity.
CAADP is organised around key thematic areas, or pillars, addressing different dimensions of food security. These pillars are ‘Sustainable Land 
and Water Management’; ‘Market Access’; ‘Food Supply and Hunger’; and ‘Agricultural Research’.
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The Third Global Review of Aid for Trade (see 
box 1), which took place on 18-19 July, aimed 
to evaluate the six-year-old Initiative’s progress 
in helping developing countries build their 
trade capacity. It showed that AfT is making 
a difference. It demonstrated clear positive 
results in areas such as resource mobilisation, 
mainstreaming, monitoring and evaluation, 
South-South cooperation, implementation 
at both the national and regional levels, and 
in increasing the role of the private sector. 
The Third Review also clearly demonstrated 
that trade liberalisation, buttressed by AfT 
support and regulatory reform, can stimulate 
investment, economic growth and poverty 
alleviation.
The Third Global Review of Aid for Trade: 
What concrete outcome? 
The Third Global Review provided an 
opportunity for participants - including 
Ministers from developed and developing 
countries, heads of agencies, the private 
sector and civil society - to recommit politically 
to the AfT Initiative. The Review supported  
the conclusions of the “Aid for Trade at a 
Glance 2011 “ publication according to which 
the AfT Initiative needs to take steps to better 
measure and show results, develop indicators, 
collaborate on monitoring and evaluation, 
improve the quality of aid, and encourage 
knowledge sharing. Donors confirmed their 
continued commitment to AfT, but stressed 
the importance of showing results, particularly 
in light of current budgetary pressures. 
Developing countries highlighted on-going 
needs and arguments for continuing to 
provide resources and regional development 
banks presented overviews of their respective 
AfT-related work and its impacts on the 
ground.  
Donors confirmed their 
continued commitment 
to AfT, but stressed the 
importance of showing 
results, particularly 
in light of current 
budgetary pressures.   
It is also clear that addressing other issues, 
including how AfT can support broader policy 
objectives such as poverty alleviation, social 
welfare, food security, gender empowerment, 
climate change adaptation, energy generation 
and sustainable development, can lead to the 
promotion of deeper coherence within the AfT 
Initiative and with the broader international 
context.
Gender empowerment, for example, is an 
issue highlighted in many of the AfT case 
stories demonstrating that increasing attention 
is being paid to the fact that empowering 
women through trade can be a catalyst for 
achieving gender equality and internationally 
agreed goals and commitments, including 
the Millennium Development Goals.  This was 
further highlighted at the joint International 
Trade Centre (ITC) and the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) 
session on “Empowering Women, Powering 
Trade:  Integrating Women into Global Value 
Chains”. At the Review, Walmart and the Inter-
American Development Bank launched a new 
initiative, the “Global Platform for Action on 
Sourcing from Women Vendors”, which aims 
to increase the share of corporate, government 
and institutional procurement sourced from 
women vendors. 
The Review confirmed that the mainstreaming 
of trade into national and regional 
development policies is making continuous 
progress. The response of LDCs to the 
monitoring questionnaire that highlighted that 
the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) – an 
AfT partnership for LDCs – is starting to fulfill 
its potential was particularly encouraging. 
LDCs are using the EIF as a concrete tool to 
help map out trade priorities and mainstream 
them into national development strategies. 
Nepal, for example, is currently benefitting 
from an EIF project on trade-capacity building 
and addressing specific problems such as trade 
deficits and rising imports. Cambodia, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zambia 
Third Global review of Aid for Trade:  
A snapshot of the outcome
Deborah Barker 
 
Box 1 - Monitoring the AfT Initiative: the AfT Global Reviews
Three Global Review meetings have been held since the AfT Initiative was launched at the December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference. 
The First Global Review, held in November 2007, helped consolidate political support around the concept of mainstreaming trade into national 
development policies and programmes. The Second Review, in July 2009, showed how developing countries and donors were making progress 
in implementing this approach. It also highlighted a continued momentum in the mobilisation of resources. The Third Global Review in July 
2011 focused on showing results; on assessing results and impacts of AfT. The positive messages on the impact of AfT emerging from the 
Review mark an important step forward for the Initiative. The ability to monitor and evaluate the results and consequent impacts of AfT is 
of prime importance for the continued mobilisation of resources given current pressures on public budgets and the growing accountability 
agenda. However, one message which also emerged was that much more can be done to improve the way in which results are systematically 
monitored and reported so as to improve the quality and confidence in results i.e to make them more methodologically robust.  
The centerpiece of the Global Review is the joint OECD-WTO publication “Aid for Trade at a Glance”.  This publication is drafted on the basis 
of OECD’s tracking of AfT flows (through its Creditor Reporting System database) and responses received to the joint monitoring exercise, 
comprising a questionnaire and – new for the Third Global Review – a call for AfT case stories.1 One point which emerges strongly from the 
high response rate to the case stories is that the joint OECD-WTO monitoring exercise is tapping into a rich desire for dialogue between the 
trade and development communities.  
Aid for Trade (AfT) is about getting trade to work for 
development. It assists countries and regions to benefit 
from the opportunities offered by the multilateral trading 
system in order to generate economic growth and 
promote poverty alleviation. Providing market access 
opportunities is a necessary, but not always sufficient 
condition, for countries to reap the benefits of trade. 
Action is also needed to help developing countries and 
in particular Least-Developed Countries (LDCs), improve 
trade-related infrastructure and overcome supply-side 
constraints. By getting developing countries and their 
development partners to integrate (or mainstream) trade 
into development planning frameworks and hence direct 
aid resource to address these constraints, the AfT Initiative 
aims to unlock the opportunities offered by trade.
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are also benefitting from the EIF process to 
mainstream trade into national development 
plans, improve the management of trade-
related technical assistance programmes and 
provide a framework for leveraging additional 
resources from donors to support economic 
diversification.  
Several sessions addressed the successes 
in and the on-going challenge of regional 
integration, including in the areas of 
infrastructure (e.g., roads, railways, transport 
corridors) and capacity building (e.g., trade 
facilitation, knowledge management).   One 
highlight of the second day of the Review was 
the presentation of the African Development 
Bank’s and the WTO’s joint paper on 
“Obstacles and Barriers to Regional Trade 
Integration in Africa”.  That report underlines 
that although there is political consensus to 
pursue regional integration, the challenge 
for Africa is to effectively implement agreed 
policies and create conditions that will result 
in deeper market and trade integration and to 
identify ways to maximize benefits and deliver 
concrete results.  
The Third Global Review was the first with 
genuine private sector participation and 
discussions highlighted the benefit of bringing 
the private sector more into the AfT Initiative 
as well as the essential role it has to play in 
ensuring that trade development projects lead 
to sustainable trade.  Efforts to engage the 
private sector include the outreach work being 
done by the World Bank as a complement 
to the AfT case story exercise through which 
it is gathering information on what private 
businesses are doing to make trade happen.  
The idea is to develop partnerships to identify 
and address the constraints that firms are 
confronted with when making investments 
in particular activities (e.g. supply chains). It 
is clear from the discussions that the private 
sector sees AfT as going beyond its corporate 
social responsibility agenda and as being a key 
part of its investment strategy.  
Private voluntary standards also featured in the 
private sector discussions, particularly regarding 
the increased barriers to trade that could result 
from the growing range of standards.  
One of the conclusions 
of the joint OECD-WTO 
monitoring exercise is 
that the delivery of AfT 
is increasingly guided by 
the Paris Principles on 
Aid Effectiveness.
Looking ahead to the Fourth Global 
Review of Aid for Trade
In his concluding remarks at the Third Global 
Review, WTO Director General Pascal Lamy, 
referred to the UN Secretary-General’s call 
to break down the artificial barriers between 
trade and other areas (e.g., food security, 
climate change, etc.) to ensure broader 
coherence with sustainable development.  
Deepening coherence will be the central 
theme of the AfT work programme for 
2012-2013 and particular attention will be 
made to the aid effectiveness agenda, which 
addresses concerns about effective and timely 
implementation and measuring impacts 
of interventions, and the need for a more 
systematic results-based management and 
reporting of results. 
One of the conclusions 
of the joint OECD-WTO 
monitoring exercise is 
that the delivery of AfT 
is increasingly guided by 
the Paris Principles on 
Aid Effectiveness.
One of the conclusions of the joint OECD-
WTO monitoring exercise is that the delivery 
of AfT is increasingly guided by the Paris 
Principles on Aid Effectiveness. Progress was 
reported in mainstreaming and communicating 
priorities, country ownership, and donor 
alignment. On the debit side, however, 
more can be done to promote results-based 
management and further actions taken to 
improve predictability and effectiveness. One 
immediate way in which these questions will 
be advanced is at the 4th High level Forum 
on Aid Effectiveness to be held in Busan, 
Korea in November 2011. Aid for Trade will be 
discussed as one of the cross-cutting themes 
at this meeting.
A new AfT work programme should be 
developed in time for the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in December 2011.  Details of 
the programme will be discussed by Members 
in the fall.  This new work programme will 
set out the actions which Members should 
take in a range of different areas, including: 
resource mobilisation; leveraging new sources 
of finance; mainstreaming; engaging the 
private sector; the Aid Effectiveness Agenda, 
including better evaluation of impacts; South-
South cooperation, particularly in terms of 
knowledge transfer and skills-sharing; and 
regional integration.  Work on these topics 
will provide the inputs for the Fourth Global 
Review of Aid for Trade planned for 2013. 
Author
 Deborah Barker is Assistant Aid for Trade 
Coordinator in the Development Division of the 
WTO
 See Bridges Weekly reporting of the event:  
WTO meeting highlights AfT success, though 
work remains, 20 July 2011.
 Notes:
1  An in-depth thematic analysis of the case stories 
is provided in a dedicated chapter included in 
the joint OECD-WTO publication “Aid for Trade 
at a Glance 2011:  Showing Results”.  See also 
the article by Frans Lammersen on page 8 of this 
issue of TNI. Regional analyses - for Africa, Asia/
Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean 
- were prepared in collaboration with regional 
development banks and, in the case of Africa 
and Asia/Pacific, UN Economic Commissions.  
A compendium document providing a brief 
overview of the over 260 case stories was also 
prepared jointly by the OECD and the WTO.
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There is a large and growing body of 
evidence1 about the positive links between 
openness to trade and economic growth, 
which depending on its pace and pattern is 
important for sustained poverty reduction.2 This 
virtuous relationship can be observed in many 
developing countries that have succeeded in 
expanding their domestic markets regionally or 
globally. Steady reductions in trade barriers have 
enabled these countries to rapidly integrate 
into the world economy through export-led 
industrialisation, thereby sharing the prosperity 
generated by globalisation. 
However, liberalising trade regimes and 
enhancing market access is often not enough 
to enable developing countries – and in 
particular the least developed countries 
(LDCs) – to reap the potential benefits of trade 
liberalisation. These countries need help in 
building trade-related capacities – in terms of 
information, policies, procedures, institutions, 
and infrastructure – to compete effectively in 
global markets. To address these supply-side 
constraints, the WTO has led the call for more 
and better Aid for Trade.
However, liberalising 
trade regimes and 
enhancing market access 
are often not enough 
to enable developing 
countries – and in 
particular the LDCs – 
to reap the potential 
benefits of trade 
liberalisation.   
Some encouraging progress
The OECD and the WTO periodically put a 
spotlight on Aid for Trade to monitor what is 
happening, what is not happening, and where 
improvements are needed. The joint OECD-
WTO publication Aid for Trade at a Glance 
2011 shows that the initiative has achieved 
considerable progress in a short time.3 
Partner countries and donor agencies are 
prioritising trade in their development 
strategies, and corresponding Aid for trade 
flows reached USD 40 billion in 2009.4 This 
translates in an average annual real growth rate 
of 15 percent (commitments) since the start 
of the initiative in 2006. Donors are meeting 
their commitments: disbursements have been 
growing at a constant rate of between 11 and 
12 percent for each year since 2006, reaching 
USD 29 billion in 2009 (see figure 1). 
The outlook for Aid for trade is stable. In Seoul 
last year, G20 leaders committed to maintain 
beyond 2011 at least the levels of Aid for 
Trade that were reached in the years 2006-08. 
Although some OECD countries are confronted 
with large budget deficits and are finding it 
difficult to respond adequately to the higher 
demand for Aid for Trade, continued growth of 
South-South cooperation is complementing the 
support provided by DAC donors.
Lessons from case stories 
To further examine the results of the almost 
USD 100 billion that has been spent on Aid 
for Trade between 2006 and 2009, partner 
countries, bilateral and multilateral donors and 
providers of South-South cooperation submitted 
over 260 case stories5 about the successes and 
failures of their Aid for Trade programmes and 
projects.6 Many stories highlight how this aid 
has enhanced the capacity of trade officials 
to effectively participate in international 
negotiations, understand the implications of 
agreements and implement them once agreed. 
Other stories recount how demand-driven, 
technical capacity-building programmes are 
helping countries define export-oriented growth 
strategies (see figure 2). For instance, an Aid 
for trade programme in Vietnam helped to 
increase the level of its exports to the United 
States from USD 1.1 billion in 2001 to USD 
8.6 billion in 2006, and increased the level of 
imports from the United States from USD 460 
million to USD 1.1 billion. Aid for Trade allowed 
a resource-poor small island like Cape Verde to 
make significant social and economic progress, 
which helped it to become more competitive 
and graduate from its status of LDC.
A large number of stories detail how industry-
specific programmes address market failures 
to help the private sector access better foreign 
markets. For example, an Aid for Trade 
project to support the competitiveness of the 
agricultural sector in Senegal increased export 
by almost 80 percent between 2005 and 2009, 
and helped create 85 new businesses. 600 small 
farmers in Ghana benefited from a programme 
aimed at expanding and diversifying the exports 
of African businesses. They now export 210 
tonnes of fresh fruit and vegetables a week 
to customers in Europe, and South African 
cosmetics companies export their products 
to Canada. Furthermore, the “Design Africa” 
brand was successfully launched in the area 
of home-furnishing products, significantly 
facilitating exports to OECD markets. 
Stories about aid programmes assisting 
companies in meeting international standards 
demonstrate successful efforts at becoming part 
of global value chains. A project in Sri Lanka 
increased export volumes to the European 
Union from 13 532 metric tonnes in 2002 to 
20 594 metric tonnes in 2008. In Pakistan, 
exports of fishery products to the European 
Union increased from 84 693 metric tonnes 
in 2002 to 135 000 metric tonnes in 2008. 
A programme helping Guatemala, Honduras, 
El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and the 
Dominican Republic expanded agricultural trade 
and generated export revenues to the value of 
USD 100 million since 2006, also with positive 
impacts on employment-creation for women. 
Accounts of trade facilitation programmes and 
economic infrastructure projects, including 
regional corridors, describe how trade costs 
were significantly reduced. A project for 
upgrading the border post between Zambia 
and Zimbabwe reduced waiting times from 
about four - five days to two days and often 
to just a few hours. A regional project in East 
Africa improved border transit times from 
three days to three hours. In Mongolia import 
clearance time dropped from three hours to 
just 23 minutes, and export clearance time 
from two hours to 13 minutes. Improvement 
of the international transit of goods between 
El Salvador and Honduras reduced clearance 
times from 62 minutes to an average of eight 
minutes.
These case stories highlight several factors that 
are critical to delivering the longer-term trade 
and development objectives of the Aid for Trade 
Initiative: ownership at the highest political 
level; active engagement of all domestic 
Aid for Trade:  Showing results
Frans Lammersen
Figure 1: Aid for Trade by Region and Category
Source: OECD-DAC, Aid activities database (CRS)
Note: Building productive capacity include trade development activities which are identifiable in the CRD since 2007.
Trade-related adjustment data are available sine 2007 and may invisible on the chart due to their small amounts.
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stakeholders, including the private sector and 
civil society; long-term donor commitment, 
and adequate and reliable funding; leveraging 
partnerships, including with providers of South–
South cooperation; combining public and 
private investment with technical assistance; 
supportive macroeconomic and structural 
adjustment policies; and good governance (see 
figure 3). 
These case stories are merely the start of a 
learning process, and many more follow-up 
activities are needed to better understand the 
different contexts of aid for trade results and 
their wider applicability. Such knowledge-
sharing should also address the question of 
how to better demonstrate that Aid for Trade 
is a worthwhile investment to improve trade 
performance, generate economic growth and 
reduce poverty. This is the topic of the OECD 
publication Strengthening Accountability in 
Aid for Trade, which outlines good practices in 
using aid to achieve trade results.7
The challenges of 
effectively delivering 
Aid for Trade are not 
unique, but are part 
and parcel of the 
broader development 
effectiveness agenda. 
 
Conclusion 
The challenges of effectively delivering Aid for 
Trade are not unique, but are part and parcel 
of the broader development effectiveness 
agenda. Improving aid quality and, more 
broadly, development effectiveness is the key 
objective of the Fourth High Level Forum on 
Aid Effectiveness,8 which will be held from 
29 November to 1 December 2011 in Busan, 
South Korea. Aid for Trade will be an important 
element on the agenda.
Author
Frans Lammersen is Principal Administrator with 
the Organisation for Economic Development and 
Co-operation (OECD). For more information about 
the Aid for Trade at a Glance 2011, please click 
here  
Notes
1 See herel
2 Patrick Love and Ralph Lattimore (2009). 
International Trade: Free, Fair and Open ? OECD 
Insights. OECD Publishing
3 OECD-WTO (2011). Aid for Trade at a glance: 
Showing results
4 See here
5 See here
6 See here
7 See here
8 See here
Figure 2. Results reported in aid-for-trade case stories
Figure 3. Number of case stories highlighting a particular lesson
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The OECD has elected to define AfT as 
concessional assistance to (mainly) low-
income countries for economic infrastructure, 
productive capacity, and technical assistance for 
regulation, capacity building and policy support 
– a broad definition that subsumes 30 percent 
or more of all concessional development 
assistance. In the latest Aid for Trade at a 
Glance, the OECD and WTO have also reported 
non-concessional trade-related lending to 
middle-income countries.  The OECD’s measure 
does not capture several other forms of AfT, 
notably investments by multilateral institutions 
in private companies and free-standing 
technical assistance.  
Because of the diversity of AfT we argue that 
no credible evaluation of AfT’s success can 
rely on one single methodology.  Rather, the 
diversity of objectives, instruments, sectors 
and activities requires using multiple lenses – 
in effect, a prism of evaluation approaches. 
This note reviews cursorily different evaluation 
approaches with a view toward pointing out 
strengths and limitations. As a corollary, it 
notes that one of the lenses, impact evaluation, 
is conspicuous for its absence in the AfT 
literature. 
Because of the diversity 
of AfT we argue that no 
credible evaluation of 
AfT’s success can rely  
on one single 
methodology.
Diversity in AfT goals
The WTO’s Task Force on AfT highlighted 
the objective of trade-related development 
assistance – broadly to help countries expand 
trade to promote growth and reduce poverty 
(WTO, 2006).  The first problem evaluators 
confront is the multiple intermediate objectives 
on the path to the overarching objectives of 
trade-led growth and poverty reduction – 
ranging from increasing exports, diversification, 
and intra-regional trade, to raising the 
incomes of small-scale (often female) 
traders, or, in the case of infrastructure, 
improving competitiveness through wider 
and cheaper access to power, transport and 
telecommunication services.  This diversity of 
objectives is highlighted in the OECD/WTO’s 
rich collection of 269 case stories of AfT.  
A simple word count of performance 
objectives, for example, surprisingly returns 
“gender” three times more often than 
“poverty”.  Similarly “environment” is 
mentioned far more often than “poverty 
reduction”. 
One commonality of this collection is the 
relative absence of quantitative indicators of 
performance.  Only 44 percent of the case 
stories have any quantitative output measure 
and only 22 percent have any quantitative 
indicator of outcomes or impacts.  Sampling 
bias may be partly to blame.  Still, these 
findings are symptomatic of Cadot’s (2011) 
conclusion that “the aid-for-trade community 
has been slow to build a culture of rigorous 
evaluation”.
Towards a prism for evaluation
To supplement case studies, understanding the 
full effects of AfT, with its variety of objectives 
and instruments, requires a prism of evaluation 
comprising three other broad approaches:  
aggregate cross-country evaluations of AfT; 
sectoral and program evaluations, and project 
evaluations.
Aggregate cross-country evaluations.
Cross-country (or panel) regressions have 
long been the choice method to evaluate the 
effectiveness of aid.  Econometric studies of AfT 
have shown large positive results in expanding 
trade.  For example, the Commonwealth 
Secretariat reports studies suggesting that a 
doubling of AfT to infrastructure would raise 
merchandise exports by 3.5 percent; while a 
doubling of aid to trade facilitation would lower 
import costs by 5 percent.  Similarly, UNECA’s 
econometric studies of Africa show that a 10 
percent rise in AfT correlates with a 0.4 percent 
increase in an index of economic diversification.  
[...] a doubling of AfT 
to infrastructure would 
raise merchandise 
exports by 3.5 percent; 
while a doubling of 
aid to trade facilitation 
would lower import 
costs by 5 percent.
This methodology has the advantage of neatly 
capturing all economic interactions.  Their results 
are also, in principle, valid in a variety of contexts, 
since they identify averages. However, this approach 
has two limitations. First, the identification of causal 
linkages is weak because even clever econometrics 
cannot filter out many confounding influences and 
reverse-causality mechanisms. Second, cross country 
averages rarely help in providing specific advice at 
the country level.
Sectoral and program evaluations
Sectoral evaluations of donors—in 
transportation, agriculture, and power— are 
rarely centered on trade issues, but sometimes 
provide settings where AfT impacts can be 
measured more directly.  Similarly, program 
evaluations, such as the World Bank (2006) 
evaluation of its support to trade over 1987-
2004, focus more directly on trade; while 
generally supportive, the analysis highlighted 
gaps in complementary policies.   The US 
evaluation  of its AfT program, a review 
comprising 265 projects over 2002-2006, 
concluded that “each US$1 invested yielded a 
return of US$42 in developing country exports 
two years later”.2 
Sector studies have the advantage of better 
identifying causal mechanisms and allowing 
for the review and assessment of individual or 
combined policy interventions. By themselves, 
however, they can rarely link policy 
interventions directly to outcomes because 
many intervening or simultaneous variables 
make attribution difficult.  Moreover, impact 
assessments are largely based on before-
after comparisons, failing to accurately take 
counterfactuals into account. 
Project evaluations. 
Project-level evaluations are common for 
trade-related interventions, but they too 
often rely on crude methodologies. For 
example, over 2002-2008, 85 percent of the 
World Bank’s trade-related projects were 
rated satisfactory or higher, with an average 
economic rate of return of 32.4 percent 
(compared with 23.7 percent for other 
projects—see World Bank Group, 2009).  Or, 
a review of 85 World Bank trade-related 
investment projects in 1995–2005, found 
that too frequently evaluations were partial 
or absent altogether.  Most projects used 
simple economic rates of returns calculations 
(31 percent), sometimes combined with 
stakeholder workshops and/or surveys to 
assess qualitative elements (an additional 26 
percent), but that 10 percent of surveyed 
projects had no evaluation at all. Even when 
quantitative, ex-post assessment cannot 
Does it work?  
Aid for Trade through the evaluation prism
Olivier Cadot and Richard Newfarmer
In the early days after the Hong Kong Ministerial in 
December 2005, trade negotiators, especially from 
developing countries, gauged their success in Aid for Trade 
(AfT) merely by increases in amounts. By this measure, the 
AfT initiative has indeed been successful, rising from $25 
billion in 2005 to $40 billion today.1 To be sure, difficulties in 
measurement complicate this calculation.
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control for outside influences, attributing to 
programs the merit of favorable conditions 
and vice versa. 
Project-level evaluation could be made much 
more informative by adopting formal impact-
evaluation methods based on treatment 
and control groups, widely used in health, 
education and other areas of development 
work. By construction, such methods make 
sense only for “targeted” interventions such 
as export promotion, technical assistance, 
or geographically limited interventions. They 
have advantages and drawbacks that mirror 
inversely those of cross-country studies: 
Whereas they identify causal mechanisms very 
precisely and provide highly relevant lessons 
on the ground, it is rarely clear how those 
lessons would carry over to different settings. 
Moreover, they are expensive: for small-scale 
activities, an evaluation can cost as much as 
the activity itself.
Still, much more could be done.  Cadot et al. 
(2011) suggest ways of conducting “quasi-
experiments” circumventing the strictures 
of more classical randomized approaches 
through the use of so-called matching and 
difference-in-differences methods. Examples 
include Brenton and Von Uexkull (2009), who 
used a difference in differences method to 
examine the effects of 88 export development 
programs in 48 different countries.  They 
found that, on average, export development 
programs have coincided with or predated 
stronger export performance. Volpe and 
Carballo’s (2008) evaluation of export 
promotion programs in six Latin American 
countries (which found positive impacts) or 
Jaud and Cadot’s (2011) evaluation of the EU’s 
Pesticides Initiative Program in Senegal, which 
found no impact, are other examples of this 
method. 
Convincing assessments 
of the effectiveness of 
AfT are unlikely to come 
from just one approach. 
Conclusions
Convincing assessments of the effectiveness 
of AfT are unlikely to come from just one 
approach.  For a given country, elements of 
program and sectoral evaluations, best in 
combination with cross-country econometric 
analysis, can begin to provide a more complete 
picture.  
That said, one lens of the prism is woefully 
under-utilized: impact evaluations of AfT 
projects. These are the best way to link 
interventions with outcomes and poverty 
impacts. Trade lags behind other fields 
in applying impact evaluation. The basic 
challenges of  this approach are twofold: 
first, mobilizing the necessary financing; and, 
second, ensuring that projects are designed 
for evaluation at the outset, by identifying 
and preserving credible control groups. To 
respond to the first challenge, Aaditya Mattoo 
suggested that one way to minimize cost 
is to fund separately the fix costs of a core 
team of specialist evaluators, perhaps located 
in one agency, such as the OECD or World 
Bank, and then finance the marginal survey 
and data work necessary for each project as 
a project component, with the specialist team 
to help guide or undertake the analysis.3 To 
respond to the second challenge, designs that 
build in quantitative benchmarks of initial 
conditions and other evaluation elements must 
become the norm rather than the exception 
to overcome negative incentives by project 
managers (who often see impact evaluations 
as sources of bad news with little upside 
potential).  Crucially, it must also become part 
of donor dialogue with countries, so that the 
evaluation culture is built into government 
interventions rather than just donor practice.
In that spirit, perhaps technical assistance 
to augment the  evaluation capacities 
of governments in developing countries 
themselves could well be a next valuable step 
in aid for trade.
Authors
 Olivier Cadot is Professor of Economics, University of 
Lausanne and Richard Newfarmer is Country Director 
for Rwanda for the International Growth Centre and 
Senior Fellow at the  World Trade Institute in Bern.
 See related article: From Market Access to Accessing 
the Market : Aid for Trade and the Program of the 
World. Elisa Gamberoni and Richard Newfarmer. 
Trade Negotiations Insights.Vol.8, No.9, November 
2009
 Notes:
1  WTO-OECD 2011
2 USAID (2010), “From Aid To Trade: Delivering 
Results – A Cross-Country Evaluation of USAID Trade 
Capacity Building Washington: USAID.
3 World Bank
 References  :
 Brenton, P. and von Uexkull, E. (2009). “Product 
specific technical assistance for exports – has it 
been effective?” The Journal of International Trade 
and Economic Development: An International and 
Comparative Review, 18(2), 235-254.
 Cadot, Olivier; A. Fernandes, J. Gourdon and 
A. Mattoo (2011), « Impact Evaluation of Trade 
Assistance: Paving the Way”; in O. Cadot, A. 
Fernandes, J. Gourdon and A. Mattoo , eds. 
(2011), Where to spend the next million? Impact 
evaluation of trade interventions; World Bank/CEPR, 
forthcoming.
 Commonwealth Secretariat (2011) “Assessing the 
Effectiveness of Aid for Trade” Case Story Global 
34, OECD/WTO data base of Case Stories of Aid for 
Trade.
 Gamberoni, E., and Richard Newfarmer, 2009. “Aid 
for Trade: Matching Supply and Demand,” World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4991; see 
also Gamberoni and Newfarmer (2011)  “Aid for 
Trade: Who Gets It, Who Should Get it?” for a more 
sophisticated econometric treatment.
 OECD/WTO (2011) Aid for Trade at a Glance: 
Showing Results Report for the Third WTO Global 
Review of Aid for Trade  OECD: Paris. 
 World Bank Group, 2009.  Unlocking Global 
Opportunities:  The World Bank’s Program of Aid for 
Trade  Washington: World Bank.
 WTO (2006), Recommendations of the Task Force on 
Aid for Trade. WT/AFT/1. 
 
Does AfT go to where it should?
One key condition for aid to be effective is that it is targeted at countries that need it and at the same time it is linked to adequate 
complementary policies.  Aid agencies use many devices, such as the World Bank’s Country Policy & Institutions Assessment (CPIA), to rate 
the ability of countries to use aid effectively, but the trade components of these indices tend to oscillate between broad but subjective 
indicators such as “transparency” or “rule-based governance” and quantifiable but narrow some such as MFN tariffs.
Gamberoni and Newfarmer (2009) proposed a framework based on cross-country econometrics to assess how successful was AfT in 
targeting needy but promising recipients. They did this by constructing an index of “potential” demand for AfT combining symptoms of 
underperformance on world markets—excessive concentration, market-share loss, poor trade infrastructure and institutions—with data 
on AfT allocation. They found that  although correctly targeted in the sense of a correlation between flows and needs, AfT left large gaps 
unfilled. Countries receiving below-average aid for trade included Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Congo DR, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Kiribati, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Nepal, Niger, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.
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In a review of the 25 most important multilateral 
donors, the five regional development banks, and 
the 24 OECD bilateral donors, UNIDO found that 
the greater interest in trade and in Aid for Trade 
(AfT) since the WTO Hong Kong Declaration in 
2005 has brought a major increase in the number 
of donors with trade programmes and in the 
amount of such aid.1 This article reviews different 
types of AfT and argues that some types of trade 
support are still under-provided and that there are 
serious risks of conflict of interest in some types of 
trade support. 
Conforming to trade rules
This category includes both bringing national 
regulations into conformity with international 
rules and learning to administer and comply 
with the rules. A number of multilateral and 
regional organisations are important in this area, 
and bilateral donors act act both directly and 
through these. But bilateral donors are rarely 
active where they might be expected to have 
particular expertise, i.e. in the rules for their 
own preferences or other trading arrangements, 
although the US efforts to promote the use of 
AGOA are a notable exception.2
21 bilateral agencies reported projects in 
agriculture and nine in textiles and clothing. But 
only six reported projects in new areas including 
environmentally friendly technology, information 
technology, and tourism. As non-agricultural trade 
is now the major part of exports by developing 
countries and the major growth area, this is an 
important gap.  
Applying trade rules
This includes, on the public policy side, all 
elements of border management: legal changes, 
standardisation of customs tariffs and statistical 
nomenclature, procedural changes to improve 
efficiency, and promoting trade corridors. The 
more market-related side of this category deals 
with improving information on markets and 
standards, providing trade data, and building the 
institutions to provide such information.
It is the information side that is less well served.  
Only four of the 30 multilateral and regional 
organisations and 14 of the 24 bilaterals assist on 
market information.  The international agencies 
compile data on trade and trade measures and 
the specialised agencies supply more technical 
information. Only a few bilateral donors offer 
specific information and assistance for imports 
into their own markets, most notably the 
Netherlands import promotion agency (CBI).  
The small number offering direct assistance of this 
type is an important gap, given that donors are 
best placed to provide information on their own 
markets. 
Learning how to negotiate
This should be a matter of building institutions, 
but has too often been treated by donors as an 
area for providing direct inputs: working alongside 
developing countries in negotiations. Some of 
the multilateral organisations provide training, 
but bilateral donors often assist the countries or 
regions with which they are negotiating.  
Donors have their own interests in what trade 
policies recipients follow, and they may, whether 
deliberately or not, mix advice with capacity 
building.   Even if the capacity building is done 
by a different department or agency, it is difficult 
to avoid actual or perceived conflicts of interest. 
The European Commission, in particular, has 
often intervened directly in ‘supporting’ African 
Caribbean Pacific group of countries with which 
it is negotiating, through not only funding, but 
also through assistance for the negotiations. Aid 
from the multilateral and regional agencies is less 
vulnerable to conflicts of interest, but advice on 
how to negotiate can slide into what to negotiate.
Learning where to negotiate 
There is capacity building on international issues, 
especially the WTO Doha Round.  But the small 
probability and uncertain effects of a Doha 
settlement suggest that multilateral trade policy is 
unlikely to be a major part of most AfT recipients’ 
trade strategies.
The regional organisations have long supported 
regional negotiations and recently all the 
international agencies except the WTO have 
moved into this. But the markets are too small 
and too much concentrated in primary products 
to offer significant developmental advantages for 
African countries.
There is extensive support for North-South 
negotiations, but this is fraught with conflicts 
of interest.  In the case of the US and EU 
negotiations with advanced developing countries, 
most of the these countries have the capacity 
both to do their own analysis and to use US or EC 
assistance without becoming dependent on it.  In 
the EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
negotiations with African and Pacific countries 
and perhaps in negotiations with the smaller Latin 
American countries and regions, it is less certain 
that all needs were met and conflicts avoided.
The risk that third countries would be affected by 
the trade policy changes of others was a driving 
force behind the WTO AfT initiative. Yet there 
appears to be no initiatives specifically targeted 
at the potential adjustment problems faced by 
developing countries following the entry into 
force of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) among 
their trading partners or competitors or following 
the granting of preferences to third parties. 
Finally, there is some donor support for trade-
related environmental negotiations, but this is at 
a more preliminary stage than trade negotiation 
support.  Trade capacity building will need 
to assist countries to meet new regulations, 
to diversify into new less carbon-intensive 
production, and to adjust to trade restrictions.
Summarizing the gaps and problems in trade 
capacity building
•	 There	is	too	little	assistance	to	understand	and	
to meet donor countries’ own trading rules, 
including preferences, FTAs (both those of 
which a developing country is itself a member 
and those of which it is not), and standards.  
•	 There	are	too	few	projects	in	manufactures	
and services.
•	 There	is	much	support	for	negotiations	whose	
effects are likely to be small, but too little for 
new issues or for adapting to negotiations by 
others.
•	 For	a	foreign	government	to	attempt	to	
influence a developing country government 
on which negotiations to prioritise or what to 
negotiate implies that it believes that its status 
as a donor gives it legitimacy to influence 
recipient governments’ policy processes 
equivalent to that of national interest groups.  
In contrast, it is notable that many developed 
countries restrict foreign lobbying.  
Options for reform
Channelling support through multilateral or 
regional agencies is one way of reducing the 
problems of poor choice of priorities and lack of 
legitimacy. This has not, however, led to a suitable 
division of responsibilities. Multilateral donors 
have not  taken over those activities where there 
is most risk of conflict of interest.   
If bilateral aid agencies consider that policy is a 
legitimate area for them to influence, then they 
should do this more effectively. If donors sought 
changes in their own countries’ policies, they 
would produce larger effects and avoid legitimacy 
problems.  These changes could include:  
•	 Liberalising	rules	of	origin	in	FTAs	and	
preferences. 
•	 Ending	neglect	of	services	in	preferences	and	
in capacity building. 
•	 Simplifying	and	making	more	transparent	
countries’ own standards.
•	 Removing	tariffs	and	other	policies	
constraining trade, e.g. in agriculture.
Multilateral and regional agencies could also focus 
their advice on their largest, developed, members 
where policy changes would have the largest 
effects.
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The achievements and risks of Aid for Trade 
Sheila Page 
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The World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the 
OECD have been spearheading the monitoring 
process regarding Aid for Trade (AfT) ever since 
its conception. Their commitment to monitoring, 
which culminates in the Global Review, has 
contributed in keeping the momentum high. 
This is clearly reflected through the substantial 
increases in financial resources dedicated to AfT 
that reached commitment levels of 40 billion 
dollars in 2009.1 However, the WTO and the 
OECD have restricted their monitoring mainly to 
the global level and the project level, primarily 
through ‘case stories’, while overlooking AfT 
effectiveness at the national level, for which there 
have been many calls by numerous countries and 
experts. As country specific factors can deeply 
influence AfT effectiveness in boosting trade 
related performance, country based assessments 
become indispensible to fully capture the impact 
of AfT on development. Thus, to complement the 
existing monitoring mechanism and address its 
shortcomings, International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (ICTSD) has embarked 
on assessing the impact and effectiveness of 
AfT at the country level. Pilot studies have been 
launched in six countries (Malawi, Mauritius, 
Jamaica, Peru, Cambodia and Nepal). This 
article focuses on the early findings and 
recommendations from Malawi and Mauritius, 
while supporting them with observations from 
Cambodia, Nepal and CARIFORUM countries. 
Funds trajectory
A general increase in the commitment of AfT 
funding has been observed for Mauritius but 
remains negligible in the case of Malawi. The 
funds have been predictable in both countries, 
with Malawi receiving funds primarily in grant 
forms. For countries like Malawi, Nepal and 
Cambodia, AfT funding has not been at the 
expense of other forms of aid, however, the 
Mauritian government has insisted that AfT 
resources allocated to Mauritius are not over and 
above the development aid. This highlights a 
persistence of the conflict between donors and 
partners in the perception of AfT funding, where 
some partner countries feel that AfT has not been 
additional to official development assistance. 
[...] trade development 
in Malawi has been 
restricted due to a 
dearth of human 
capacity. 
Unlike Mauritius, Malawi has received the highest 
amount of funding for building trade related 
infrastructure. Nevertheless, trade development 
in Malawi has been restricted due to a dearth of 
human capacity. Thus, many have recommended 
a change of focus from infrastructure projects 
towards human capacity building and private 
sector development as a driver for AfT. It has 
been stressed that the international focus on 
short-term results and strong disbursement data 
might, to a degree, undermine investment in local 
human capacity and in the development of local 
institutions.
As anticipated, 
ownership by the 
partner country has 
emerged as a vital 
factor in achieving AfT 
effectiveness.
The sustaining  of achievements made through 
AfT emerges as another challenge that needs 
to be overcome. While sustainability criteria are 
built into a project’s design itself in some cases, 
this is not so for all the projects and evidence of 
partner countries providing sufficient funding to 
the project after donor funding dries up is limited. 
For example, the government of Malawi was 
donated computers by the WTO under the Joint 
Integrated Technical Assistance Programme for 
four reference centres; however, further funding 
was not allocated for the maintenance of these 
computers once funding from the WTO ended. As 
a consequence of this, the reference centres are 
currently not in operation.
Ownership
As anticipated, ownership by the partner country 
has emerged as a vital factor in achieving AfT 
effectiveness. Mauritius, which has mainstreamed 
trade in a systematic manner and integrated 
it in its development agenda, is benefiting 
considerably from AfT. Consequently, AfT has 
been successful in creating a strong base for 
export development while also providing new 
opportunities for export diversification during the 
periods of reduced demand for traditional exports. 
The example of Mauritius can be compared with 
the one of Cambodia where increasing sectoral 
diversification in the sugar industry and the rice 
sector, respectively, have contributed towards an 
improved business climate, gains in competiveness 
and increased flows of FDI.
In other countries, while trade has been 
mainstreamed in national development plans, 
there is still a lack of clear understanding among 
key stakeholders on how trade objectives can 
be realised through specific activities at the 
programme level.  Moreover, there is little evidence 
that trade is mainstreamed in other ministries. 
In Malawi, for the past five years the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food Security has focused on 
maize production primarily with regards to food 
security, thereby neglecting areas such as export 
value addition and diversification. The objective 
was to first develop productive capacity and then 
to find markets at a later stage. As a result, some 
agriculture projects that did mainstream trade in 
their plans  had a limited impact (as it was not a 
priority for the ministry) on raising living conditions 
for farmers. Due to the current large maize surplus, 
the government is now realising that trade is 
important, and has hence started to move beyond 
focusing on food security alone. 
The Caribbean Aid for Trade Regional Integration 
Trust Fund (CARTFund), which was designed 
to assist CARIFORUM countries in boosting 
growth through trade and regional integration 
suffered from a similar drawback, as the region 
lacked a strategic framework for the use of 
funds. Therefore, while ownership can be seen 
as indispensible for the effectiveness of AfT 
and to maximise its impact, AfT also needs to 
take into consideration that developing efficient 
ownership in countries which lack institutional 
capacities falls within the ambit of AfT measures. 
An aide for Aid for Trade – Early findings and 
recommendations from country studies 
Rishabh Kumar Dhir
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Alignment
When there is a high degree of alignment 
between the donors’ and the partner 
countries’ development agenda, the benefits 
of AfT are the greatest. Mauritius is a shining 
example of this point. Aid delivery, in the case 
of Mauritius, is in complete harmony with 
the country systems. Funds are transferred 
through direct budget support to the National 
Treasury, blended with domestic resources and 
are spent across-the-board. On the other hand, 
in countries like Malawi and Nepal, the use 
of country systems is limited. Malawi presents 
an interesting case as donor alignment is 
restricted to Malawi’s priorities, which at 
this juncture, do not focus heavily on trade, 
thereby retarding the alignment prospects 
between the donors’ and Malawi’s priorities 
due to insufficient ownership. This entails 
donors largely dominating project design, 
staff recruitment as well as procurement. Such 
an approach to aid restricts the capacities 
of the partner country and in turn facilitates 
dependence on the donor expertise -- an issue 
that needs to be combated from both the 
donors and the partners ends. 
Donor Coordination
AfT has also a more pronounced impact on 
partner countries in a scenario where there 
is efficient coordination amongst donors and 
hence, projects are not repetitive. Donor 
coordination has improved significantly in 
Malawi, largely due to the Ministry of Finance’s 
Division of Labour Matrix, the establishment of 
Sector Working Groups, Common Approach to 
Budget Support and informal donor discussion 
forums. However, it has remained limited in 
the field of ‘Trade Development’ and almost 
negligible in ‘Trade Policy and Regulation’. 
Mauritius, on the other hand, displays efficient 
donor coordination, where donors carry out 
shared diagnosis and analytical work as well as 
joint implementation, monitoring, evaluations 
and reviews. Inefficient donor coordination, 
which can be attributed to lack of information 
among donors and/or simply because the 
government does not make efforts to prevent 
donors from duplicating efforts, can restrict 
the effectiveness of AfT.
South-South Cooperation
South-South cooperation is furthering the 
effectiveness of AfT in all the countries where 
the studies were conducted. Local stakeholders 
in Malawi have highlighted that Southern 
donors seem to fund projects that DAC donors 
do not. However, it should be noted that 
Southern donors do not function within the 
sphere of the Paris Declaration and thus do 
not apply its principles; this in turn runs the 
risk of limited aid effectiveness while at the 
same time curtails the scope of enhanced 
cooperation with other donors.
Local stakeholders 
in Malawi have 
highlighted that 
Southern donors seem 
to fund projects that 
DAC donors do not.
Absorptive Capacities
One of the major challenges that AfT needs 
to overcome is restrictive local absorptive 
capacity. It emerges as a strong bottleneck 
in achieving AfT development goals as it 
invariably delays an efficient utilisation process 
of AfT funds. Absorptive capacities remain 
weak in all the countries studied except 
Mauritius. This highlights the need for human 
resources development to be undertaken 
through formal training courses, coaching and 
mentoring by advisers, on-the-job training 
and learning by doing. It is particularly crucial 
for key ministries to establish a permanent 
group of dedicated project teams who are 
trained as technical and managerial staff.  
The CARTFund example has highlighted that 
project design and technical skills can only 
be learned through long-term exposure and 
direct involvement in project management in 
all phases. In particular, donors need pursue 
a strong strategy for developing absorptive 
capacities of the partner countries for an 
efficient use of their tax-payer’s money.   
Impact
While AfT is not the only factor responsible 
for increasing exports in a country, it certainly 
has a potential to deeply influence trade 
performance. This is thus a central indicator 
for measuring the impact of AfT. The country 
studies have highlighted that the impact of 
AfT on trade performance has been extremely 
varied. For instance, in Malawi, the positive 
impacts of AfT projects on export levels have 
not been large enough to allow Malawi 
to reduce its ballooning trade deficit. The 
experience of Mauritius tells a different story : 
while its exports are suffering due to external 
constraints such as changes in global demand 
patterns, AfT has nevertheless been successful 
in improving the export performance and the 
business climate, particularly through the sugar 
sector reforms. 
Cambodia shares a similar success story of 
export base diversification with other sectors 
like pulp of wood/paper, mineral products, 
plastics and prepared foods growing alongside 
garments.   However, in Nepal, while 
infrastructure projects have helped reduce 
transaction costs and positively influenced 
trade performance, AfT has not successfully 
addressed supply-side constraints to increase 
trade capacity at the macro level. 
A general overview of the studies reveals 
that while impact of AfT for some countries, 
particularly Malawi, has been limited and 
insufficient to spur trade and development, 
AfT has introduced certain positive aspects and 
institutions which are guiding such countries 
towards recognising the importance of trade in 
development. 
Conclusion
AfT has a strong potential in contributing to 
the trade performance of a country, which 
in turn can foster its development. The 
case of Mauritius has illuminated this point; 
however, AfT is yet to prove beneficial for 
other countries like Malawi. Across-the-board, 
it can be concluded that some countries have 
a stronger need to develop ownership, while 
some need AfT for private sector development 
and local capacity building; others may benefit 
through economic diversification. In this 
regard, alignment between the donors and the 
partner country to assess the true development 
requirements plays a vital role.    
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Box 1 - How were the country-specific studies conducted? 
To conduct the monitoring of AfT, ICTSD has pursued a bottom-up approach to highlight the interactions of AfT measures with the unique 
circumstances of individual countries. A methodology was jointly developed by ICTSD and the South Asian Watch on Trade Economy and 
Environment, based on a series of quantitative and qualitative indicators, such as additionality and predictability of funds, local ownership, 
donors’ alignment and coordination, among others.2 This methodology was used by local independent researchers to conduct the country 
specific studies. They then worked in close collaboration with government agencies, development partners, private sector and other local 
stakeholders, collecting information and conducting structured interviews with key national players in the AfT field. Before the completion 
of the studies, the draft reports were scrutinised through a ‘national consultation’ in each country to share the initial findings with 
various stakeholders, whose insights were used to finalize the studies. As a last step, the studies underwent a process of peer review by 
researchers and practitioners at the national as well as international level to verify the findings, while also incorporating their comments and 
recommendations for the benefit of the studies. 
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The Aid for Trade (AfT) initiative has been hailed 
as highly successful in raising the profile of trade 
as a tool for development. Developing countries 
have increasingly mainstreamed trade in their 
development strategies, while donors have 
responded by mobilising additional resources 
for trade-related programmes and projects 
(together referred to as operations). The AfT 
initiative however requires a better assessment 
of its outcomes and impacts in terms of trade 
performance, poverty reduction, growth and 
development.
In this perspective, a “meta-evaluation” of the 
way aid agencies evaluate and assess their trade-
related operations has been conducted by the 
Groupe d’Economie Mondiale at Sciences Po for 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), as part of the OECD work 
conducted in preparation for the forthcoming 
publication Strengthening Accountability in Aid 
for Trade.1 The purpose of this meta-evaluation 
study was (i) to compare what policy makers in 
charge of delivering international aid would like 
to know about AfT results and what existing 
evaluations of AfT operations offer and (ii) to 
identify avenues for better adequacy between 
evaluation needs and results. 
The method used 
The study focused on two countries – Ghana 
and Vietnam – and two sectors – transport 
and storage.2 It analysed 162 evaluations of 
AfT operations notified to the OECD DEReC 
database by OECD countries and international 
organisations.3 We used a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methods to identify 
the implicit interests of evaluators, as well as the 
gap between these interests and the information 
needs of AfT policy makers.
The quantitative technique was very simple: 
we considered the occurrence of a set of key 
words or expressions that could reasonably be 
considered crucial in evaluating AfT related 
operations. This method benefits from a clearly 
defined metric: the frequency with which 
key words are mentioned per 100 pages. It is 
however limited by the choice of key words and 
expressions.
The 48 key words and expressions selected in 
the study ranged from specific trade concerns to 
broad development topics (see Table 1). Indeed, 
while trade concerns are key because trade is 
a proven engine for growth, trade is not an 
end in itself. The ultimate goal of AfT is to help 
countries harness trade behind development 
and poverty reduction objectives – objectives 
which themselves have many dimensions, from 
income creation to income distribution to 
broader social concerns (such as gender equality 
or environmental sustainability).
The frequency with which words and 
expressions appear does not say much about 
their meaning or the context in which they 
are used. A critical complement was thus a 
systematic qualitative reading of a narrower set 
of the 42 evaluations identified as looking at the 
most trade-oriented operations. The idea was to 
look beyond the issues explicitly treated by the 
evaluators, to learn more about how each issue 
was evaluated and to assess the significance of 
the information provided. 
What did evaluations look at?
The key – quite surprising – result was that 
evaluations of AfT operations do not say much 
about trade. “Trade” and “exports” were 
not among the most frequently used words, 
“imports” were mentioned even less often. 
References to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and trade agreements were largely 
absent. In the majority of cases, the trade 
impact of AfT operations was not even 
addressed. Worse, in many instances, operations 
dealing with trade-related issues (such as 
supply-side constraints or transport and energy 
market issues) were never explicitly designed to 
achieve trade objectives. 
The key – quite 
surprising – result was 
that evaluations of AfT 
operations do not say 
much about trade.
Conversely, the evaluations referred extensively 
to broad development-related concepts. Most 
evaluations evoked the impact of operations 
on poverty reduction, the environment, 
Aid for Trade effectiveness:  
What do evaluations say?
Claire Delpeuch and Patrick Messerlin*
Trade Component Development Component Procedures and Techniques
Trade infrastructure indicator
Export Specific regulation performance
Import Regulatory framework monitoring
Trade balance Governance review
Comparative advantage Supply-side constraint impact assessment
Gains from trade Expenditure cost efficiency
Trade restriction Private sector growth cost-benefits
Tariff Technical assistance short term
quota Economic growth long term
Subsidy Competitiveness discount rate
Technical barriers to trade Efficiency counterfactual
Sanitory/Phytosanitory standards Effectiveness control variables
Trade facilitation Sustainability difference in differences
Adjustment policies Poverty reduction randomization
Trade assistance gender
Trade-related technical assistance
WTO
Regional trade agreements 
Preferential trade agreements
Table 1: List of words and expressions used in the Meta-evaluation
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social and gender issues as well as private 
sector participation. However, they did so in 
loose terms. For instance, gender was either 
mentioned in passing or measured in units that 
had little relevance to a project’s impact on 
women’s economic or societal situation (e.g. the 
number of women participating in a seminar). 
Following DAC guidelines, most evaluations 
assessed whether project implementation 
deadlines were met, whether budgets were 
disbursed and respected as well as whether 
operations were in line with government’s 
broader objectives and strategies. However, 
medium- to long-term impacts were often not 
investigated for particularly important factors 
such as an operation’s return on investment.
In addition, the evaluations usually did not 
clarify the policy linkages which matter most to 
policy makers. For instance, potential impacts 
of trade policy instruments on funded projects 
were not examined despite the fact that 
high tariffs on inputs crucial to an operation 
would obviously limit its effectiveness – just 
as high tariffs imposed on import of foreign 
substitutes for an operation’s output could 
artificially increase its benefits. Nor was there an 
evaluation of linkages with “behind the border” 
measures such as regulatory reforms or private 
sector policies. 
In addition, the 
evaluations usually did 
not clarify the policy 
linkages which  
matter most to policy 
makers.
How did evaluations proceed?
In most evaluations, impact assessment was solely 
based on the analysis of documents obtained from 
officials and sector stakeholders and/or on the 
results of field interviews. Very few evaluations 
relied on data collection and quantitative 
techniques allowing for more robust performance 
assessments.
Such practices are problematic. First, the use of 
qualitative methods was not always satisfying: 
it was rarely explained how the available 
documents were analysed and how results were 
derived. Second, it is difficult to assess outcomes 
exclusively through use of qualitative methods. 
Qualitative methods often leave open the problem 
of attribution, that is, the measurement of the 
part of the observed changes that results from AfT 
operation versus from exogenous factors. In some 
evaluations, economic analysis was used to predict 
the impact of operations, and to judge their 
relevance. While this approach does not address 
the causality problem, it does improve the quality 
of the a priori evaluation of an operation. 
To be fair, all these criticisms need to be put 
into perspective. Failure to refer to specific trade 
results can be explained, at least in part, by 
the absence of stated trade-related objectives 
in the operations’ initial mandates. In most 
cases, little ex ante economic analysis of the 
operations had been undertaken, resulting in 
a lack of quantifiable definitions of objectives 
and of baseline data that would have made 
possible a comparison of the ex ante and ex 
post situations.  Moreover, it is often difficult to 
assign macroeconomic outcomes and impacts 
to individual AfT operations given the complex 
array of variables influencing outcomes. 
Finally, chosen objectives sometimes conflict. 
For instance, in one evaluation, support to 
the agricultural sector was said to have had a 
positive pro-poor impact through successful 
targeting of poor recipients although it failed to 
promote growth or export diversification, raising 
serious questions about its sustainability. 
Conclusion
The study demonstrated that, to date, in 
many AfT evaluations, causal links between 
operations and performance are not established 
– be performance defined in terms of trade, 
poverty reduction or intermediate objectives. 
Consequently, their conclusions give little insight 
into whether AfT works and why. 
The study also showed that there were few clear 
links between donors and the issues assessed 
or the methods used. In other words, there 
were few systematic “leaders” in terms of 
evaluations of a given topic for a given country 
and/or sector. This suggests that a broader 
sample of evaluations would not have produced 
substantially different results. 
In a time of harsh budgetary constraints, 
continued increases in AfT contributions require 
a better understanding of what works and 
how. One option to achieve this understanding 
is to use sophisticated techniques that enable 
thorough evaluations of the impacts of 
operations. Such projects are currently being 
undertaken, notably by researchers of the World 
Bank. Yet, as such techniques are expensive 
and time consuming; they can be used only for 
a carefully chosen subset of AfT operations. 
Hence, there is also a need to identify simple 
guidelines that would already improve 
substantially evaluations, while requiring 
minimal time, skills and financial resources. 
The meta-evaluation study suggests that every 
operation should include an ex ante assessment 
of the situation defining quantifiable objectives 
and providing the information (including data) 
necessary to measure whether objectives were 
met ex post. In this context, it recommends 
that evaluators should answer systematically 
a thorough sequence of questions that would 
provide a framework for assessing operations’ 
impact in a more thorough way.4  
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Many trade officials, international trade 
organisations, donors and academics would 
argue that it is those countries’ responsibility 
to step up to the challenge of reconciling trade 
with their development efforts. While this is 
true, many of those engaged in trade promotion 
and AfT avoid looking at the underlying reasons 
for why developing countries do not mainstream 
trade in their development strategy. The problem 
with this approach is that it can be counter-
productive in those developing countries that do 
not have the human and institutional capacity 
to mainstream trade in their development 
strategy. It carries significant risks, both for the 
development of such countries and also for the 
effectiveness of AfT. This is because the principle 
of additionality – one of the core principles on 
which AfT is based – means that aid is provided 
to such countries irrespective of their ability to 
absorb it. What tends to transpire on the ground 
is that it is not invested in local productive 
capacity, leading to a distortion of markets, aid 
dependency, greater income inequality  and a 
lower likelihood that such countries will be able 
to effectively participate in the global trading 
system. 
AfT has proved to be 
largely ineffective in 
Malawi because it has 
had limited success in 
developing the local 
human and institutional 
capacity required to  
enable trade. 
The case of Malawi: Why has AfT has not 
delivered on its promises so far?
AfT has proved to be largely ineffective in 
Malawi because it has had limited success in 
developing the local human and institutional 
capacity required to enable trade. A key 
contributor to this has been a failure by trade 
promoters and the donor community to identify 
where Malawi stands on its development curve. 
AfT solutions have tended to assume that 
Malawi is on the same point on its development 
curve as Cambodia, Vietnam, Ghana or Rwanda. 
Yet Malawi simply does not have the scale of 
human capacity that is required to ensure a pro-
poor business environment. It lacks the capacity 
to ensure businesses have affordable access to 
finance, business development services, inputs, 
information, markets, labour and technology. It 
does not have the capacity to provide education 
services to its rapidly growing population on 
a necessary scale to allow the majority of 
its labour force to effectively participate in 
Malawi’s effort to generate value added. The 
human capacity required to ensure that civil 
society and government are able to support 
an institutional and regulatory framework that 
a pro-poor business enabling environment 
requires is inadequate. The core problem is that 
civil society, government and the development 
community have not adequately recognised the 
role that private sector development and trade 
play in their poverty reduction objectives.
A failure to recognise where Malawi stands 
on its development curve has led to the sub-
optimal design of trade-related projects. Despite 
large AfT flows aimed at addressing areas 
such as trade promotion and development, 
projects in this area tend to be piecemeal and 
fairly uncoordinated while pursuing short term 
rather than long term goals. Since trade and 
private sector development is not central to 
the government’s development efforts, such 
projects are not working within a locally-owned 
framework that seeks to address all elements of 
the bigger picture. Instead Aft pursues relatively 
short-term goals such as road construction or 
the reduction of the time it takes to obtain trade 
licenses, at the expense of investment in the 
institutional capacity of the road and license 
authorities. Another example is the provision by 
donors of financing and business development 
services directly to exporters and potential 
exporters. Such activities tend to mitigate 
appropriate, comprehensive and targeted 
efforts to enable Malawian stakeholders 
to develop Malawi’s financial and business 
development service sectors by addressing issues 
such as weak contract law, lack of adequate 
information on credit history and the conduct 
of unfair business practices that constrain fair 
competition. 
As a result, although many projects that seek 
to promote or develop trade tend to meet 
project targets, there has been a limited overall 
impact of AfT, notably on Malawi’s ability to 
export. Malawi’s trade in goods deficit as a 
percentage of GDP rose from seven per cent in 
2001 to 21 per cent in 2010. The outcome has 
been aid-dependent growth with little prospect 
for long-term sustainability. Trade and private 
sector development remain off the government’s 
agenda. The government argues that Malawi’s 
exporters do not have the capacity to compete 
in regional and global markets, and therefore 
its efforts to reduce or alleviate poverty must 
be based on the development of Malawi’s own 
productive systems without sufficient market 
exposure. 
A failure to recognise 
where Malawi stands on 
its development curve has 
led to the sub-optimal 
design of trade-related 
projects.
Which are the areas of AfT success in 
Malawi?
Fortunately since 2010, Malawi has recognised 
that it cannot merely focus on poverty reduction 
and development through increasing production 
without market linkages. It has acknowledged 
the importance of a more comprehensive 
approach to addressing development constraints 
and has launched a number of sector-wide 
approaches in areas such as agriculture, health, 
transport and education. For example in 2010 it 
launched the Agriculture Sector Wide Approach 
that is seeking to market Malawi’s agriculture 
sector that has so far been focused on 
production without sufficient market linkages. 
In the transport sector, donor prioritisation and 
government ownership were essential success 
factors to improving Malawi’s infrastructure. 
Key recommendation: The necessity to 
reconcile trade and development thinking 
and efforts
The AfT initiative is interesting as it brings 
together two strands of thinking that bear a 
subtle, but essential difference. On the one 
hand, there is private sector thinking. This is 
bottom-line driven, encapsulated in businesses 
and trade officials in both developing and 
developed countries. What matters is the 
best deal that can be obtained for one’s own 
businesses – or country – while taking the 
regulatory and business environment as a given. 
The trade community tends to see little benefit 
in engaging with governments to improve the 
Where Aid for Trade is failing and why:  
the example of Malawi
Jonathan Said
In 2005 the World Trade Organisation launched the Aid for Trade 
(AfT) concept in a bid to strengthen the participation of developing 
countries in the multilateral trading system. AfT is proving to be an 
effective tool for countries that have recognized the potential of AfT 
for development and that have internalised trade in their national 
development plans. Such countries include Cambodia, Vietnam, 
Rwanda and Ghana.
However it is also proving to be ineffective in countries that have failed 
to reconcile the trade and development spheres. What should be the 
response of the trade and development communities in such countries?
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business environment, because its attempts so 
far have borne little fruit.
On the other hand, there is the development 
thinking within the government, local civil 
society and the donor community. Their 
approach to trade is that it must be beneficial 
to a country’s efforts to develop and to reduce 
or alleviate poverty. However, all too often 
the thinking in key policy circles in developing 
countries is that if the participation to the 
multilateral trading system is not beneficial in 
the short-term, it is better not to expose the 
economy to it.  Following this reasoning, issues 
such as crisis management, food security and 
health become a much higher priority in the 
policy agenda.
Partner country 
ownership has 
emerged as a vital 
factor in achieving AFT 
effectiveness but on 
the ground the reality 
differs since trade 
and private sector 
development continues 
to be misaligned with 
Malawi’s development 
agenda.
Partner country ownership has emerged as a 
vital factor in achieving AFT effectiveness but 
on the ground the reality differs since trade 
and private sector development continues 
to be misaligned with Malawi’s development 
agenda. Europe and Asia did not attain their 
current capacity to participate in the multilateral 
trading system in five or ten years. Asia had 
a high level of human capacity prior to the 
recent rapid rate of development. It was this 
human capacity that enabled the strength of 
the institutions that generated the leadership 
and drive for development. Trade was a key part 
of that development plan. The key enabling 
factor was a sufficient level of human capacity 
that recognised the importance of trade and 
private sector development to the main national 
goals, including poverty reduction and the 
improvement of standards of living.
Therefore if traders, trade officials and 
international trade organisations  are to meet 
their objectives in Malawi, and in many other 
countries across Africa, they have to incorporate 
economic development thinking into their 
thought process by viewing trade as a subset 
of private sector development, and viewing 
human capacity and institutional development 
as essential for private sector development. 
It can then drive local stakeholders and 
the development community, including the 
International Monetary Fund, to induce trade 
and private sector development thinking into 
their poverty reduction and crisis management 
thinking. In this way AfT can become effective 
in countries that currently lack the capacity to 
transform their own economy by ensuring that 
civil society, governments, the private sector 
and the development community have a better 
understanding of what private sector and trade 
development requires.
What specific approach should AfT take in 
countries such as Malawi and why?
In order to boost AfT in Malawi, it must: 
•	 identify	where	Malawi	stands	in	
its development curve and then 
comprehensively target the development of 
human capacity that can make its own case 
for private sector development and trade;
•	 support	programmes	that	assist	Malawi	in	
assuming its development responsibility and 
set human capacity development as the 
primary goal of AfT; 
•	 make	the	case	about	the	importance	of	
trade for economic development;
•	 facilitate	the	development	of	the	capacity	of	
local stakeholders to ensure that the number 
of people participating in business’ efforts 
to generate value added is maximized;
•	 not	be	too	hasty	in	attempting	to	meet	
short-term goals and instead focus on long-
term goals; and
•	 mainstream	trade	into	development	
priorities so that the trade and development 
communities can work towards  a common 
agenda. 
It is local stakeholders  
that are responsible for 
the enabling environment 
within which economic 
development must take 
place.
Conclusion
It is ultimately local stakeholders that need to 
recognise that businesses are best placed to 
generate the value added that is required to 
meet their poverty reduction objectives. Trade 
is a key instrument, as well as private sector 
development, in the policy toolbox to help 
achieve this goal. It is local stakeholders  that 
are responsible for the enabling environment 
within which economic development must take 
place. As happened in all other continents, 
Malawi’s ability to participate in the multilateral 
trading system will be attained once it finds 
a development model that works. In order to 
facilitate this process, AfT needs to address 
Malawi’s capacity to find that development 
model.
Author
 Jonathan Said is senior economist at Imani 
Development in Malawi.
 Imani Development is a group of private, 
employee-owned economic and development 
consultancy firms, offering a range of services 
directed towards policy makers as well as the 
industrial, agricultural and commercial sectors 
and development agencies.
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System
AfT in Malawi over time, US$ million current prices 
18 Issue 7 | Volume 10 | October 2011
Trade liberalisation, in the context of the 
multilateral trading system (MTS) and regional 
integration processes, such as for instance, the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), the East African Community 
(EAC), have provided African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries with many market access 
opportunities. However because of supply-
side constraints including the lack of necessary 
infrastructure (roads, ports, telecommunication 
facilities…) and insufficient trade facilitation 
institutions, many Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) have been unable to take advantage 
of these market access opportunities. The 
lack of knowledge by private sector and other 
stakeholders about these potential opportunities 
and how to access them have also affected the 
level of participation of LDCs in the MTS. Trade, 
which is yet often considered an engine of 
growth, has therefore not been fully used to spur 
economic growth in some of these countries. 
Despite the Aid for Trade initiative launched in 
2005 to help LDCs to effectively take part in 
international trade, LDCs participation in the MTS 
still remain very low because of many challenges 
faced by the private sector in these countries. In 
Malawi, for example AfT is not helping to build 
the institutional capacity that the government, 
civil society and the private sector require to plan 
their respective development roles and boost 
Malawi’s ability to export.1 The lack of awareness 
about AfT projects by many stakeholders including 
the private sector and bureaucratic tendencies by 
donors especially on disbursements hinders the 
effectiveness of AfT. 
Success Stories
Because many countries have not fully benefited 
from market access opportunities available 
through the MTS due to their inability to 
produce and export efficiently, AfT is necessary 
in the developing agenda of many LDCs. Many 
African countries have benefited from the AfT 
initiatives and have as a result been able to access 
international markets. 
The UK Mission to the UN has cited several 
examples of the UK AfT best practices that deliver 
real results for developing countries including 
the launch of the African Free Trade Area 
initiative in which the UK is investing in transport 
infrastructure with one stop border posts along 
major transport corridors in East Africa. A one 
stop border post at Chirundu, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe resulted in 66 percent waiting time 
reduction and a 600,000 USD savings to local 
trucking firms is also an example of the impact 
that AfT has on the development of a country. 
In Malawi, an aid assistance of 18.7 million USD 
from the International Development Agency, 
the World Bank and the EU was provided in the 
form of the Business Environment Strengthening 
Technical Assistance Project (BESTAP) in support 
of the World Bank Country Assistance Strategy. 
It is also given as one of the success story of AfT. 
This project started in 2007 and will continue 
until 2012 with the aim of improving the business 
climate in the country. It is reported as having 
assisted in the review and drafting of thirty-
two business related laws out of which seven 
have already been passed into law. Through 
the project, the commercial division of the High 
Court was established whose outcome has been 
the reduction of commercial dispute settlement 
time from 200 days to 98 within two years. As 
part of the project a Public-Private Dialogue 
(PPD) – a high level consultative forum involving 
the Government and private sector – was also 
established in 2008. 
AfT positive impacts on exports: the case of 
Rwanda and Malawi 
AfT, has in some countries been used to boost 
export marketing efforts either through direct 
investment in a particular sector or through 
investments in capacity building in regulatory 
frameworks and in institutions directly involved 
with exports. Since coffee is a key export crop 
for Rwanda, the country developed in 2003 a 
very aggressive strategy to increase total export 
of coffee and develop the industry into the high 
quality end of the coffee market. To achieve this, 
the country required an investment of 69 million 
USD out of which 25.75 million USD came from 
donors and NGOs and 23 million USD from the 
private sector. Through donor-funded activities, 
coffee producers in the country were able to 
develop buyer-seller relationships and also the 
project assisted in raising the quality of local 
coffee. Regulatory reforms implemented through 
the project have also allowed individual Rwandan 
cooperatives and the private sector involved 
in coffee production to negotiate directly with 
speciality coffee roasters in the US and Europe, 
thereby enabling sellers to offer their coffee at 
prices that are twice international market prices2. 
In Malawi, the National Working Group on Trade 
Policy, a trade consultative forum involving the 
public sector, private sector, the academia and 
the civil society were able to organise a Malawian 
TradeConnection event in Edinburgh in 2007. The 
event which was part of a three-year Scotland-
Malawi Trade Partnership (SMTP) project was 
funded by the Scottish Government and was 
meant to showcase the best of a diversity of 
Malawian products already introduced and 
available in the Scottish market.  A number of 
deals for Malawian products were agreed as a 
result of the event. The SMTP project which is 
managed by Imani Development is helping in 
the building of export capacity in Malawi and is 
also facilitating exports to Europe in general and 
in particular to Scotland. As a follow up to the 
Edinburgh trade event, an Exporters Association 
of Malawi was established and has been very 
active in the consolidation of exports for small and 
medium enterprises that do not have the capacity 
to export on their own.
Private sector participation 
Trade is a powerful engine for economic growth 
and poverty reduction and to realise this potential, 
all stakeholders and in particular the private 
sector must be fully involved in all development 
impact of AfT. The private sector which is key 
in spurring development in LDCs constitutes 
not only enterprises of various sizes but also 
Business Membership Organisations (BMO) such 
as Chambers of Commerce and other trade 
associations and organisations. The private sector 
is a prominent stakeholder in AfT since it is not 
only a major beneficiary of trade-related technical 
assistance but it is also a key agent in making 
any AfT effective. BMOs such as chambers of 
commerce are intermediary institutions between 
the public and private sector which are formed 
through collective private sector actions. These 
organisations offer a wide range of advocacy and 
Aid for Trade : Success stories and lessons
Simon Itaye
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advisory services to their members and in most 
cases contribute to the lowering of transaction 
costs of trade. Because of the importance that 
private sector plays in an economy, BMOs have 
the potential to contribute to AfT initiatives by 
acting as a link between the private sector and 
AfT implementation units or organisations to 
support the implementation of AfT initiative.
The private sector is a 
prominent stakeholder 
in AfT since it is not only 
a major beneficiary of 
trade-related technical 
assistance but it is also a 
key agent in making any 
AfT effective.
With aid from the Danish Government, a BMO 
network project for ten countries comprising 
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, 
South Africa, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe was formed in 2008. This 
network project, which is coordinated by the 
Confederation of Danish Industry in association 
with the Kenya Association of Manufacturers, 
aims at developing and advancing common 
advocacy for business in the Eastern and 
Southern African (ESA) region. It acts as a 
platform for knowledge sharing and learning 
from best practices and the group is also used to 
develop and promote common policy positions 
for domestic and regional integration issues. 
Similar groups have been formed in some other 
African countries to advance a common good for 
different countries. The African Trade Insurance 
Agency (ATIA) which was founded in 2001 by 
African countries with financial and technical 
support from the World Bank Group through a 
COMESA initiative is another successful case study 
of private sector participation in AfT.
[...] there are a 
number of factors that 
inhibit private sector 
participation in the AfT 
agenda.
Although there are many successful Trade 
Related Technical Assistance case studies, there 
are a number of factors that inhibit private 
sector participation in the AfT agenda. In many 
countries, donor initiatives do not focus on 
actual productivity improvements or on exports 
but in most cases, donor aid is directed towards 
capacity building mainly in government and trade 
facilitation institutions. Ownership of such AfT 
projects is therefore limited to the government 
and not necessary to the private sector which is 
the locus of production, trade and development. 
Moreover in countries like Malawi the enabling 
environment still remain very hostile with core 
issues that affect investments and business not 
being urgently addressed. 
Making AfT effective
The WTO and the OECD have been tasked with 
monitoring AfT and the International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) has 
been conducting AfT assessments in a number of 
developing countries. 
According to UNECA, based on 114 AfT case 
studies that the organisation reviewed, there 
are some common factors that may affect the 
success or failure of AfT implementation. Some 
of the success factors include wide stakeholder 
participation and involvement, ownership of 
the initiative by beneficiary country and the 
establishment of networks and partnerships 
among private and public actors. Factors that 
have been included as impeding successful 
implementation of AfT are notably the absence 
of institutions or weak institution set up, 
burdensome bureaucratic procedures especially 
those relating to funds disbursement, insufficient 
resources and or absorption capacities and lack of 
qualified or high turnover human capital. 
Ownership of such 
AfT projects is 
therefore limited to the 
government and not 
necessary to the private 
sector which is the locus 
of production, trade and 
development.
From the above factors it is clear that the success 
of any AfT initiative depends on the coordination 
between different stakeholders but in particular 
donors and the recipient countries. Another 
important aspect of AfT is the foreseeable 
sustainability of the AfT initiative. If proper 
sustainable systems and mechanisms are not put 
in place, AfT projects could end up as isolated 
events instead of well-coordinated projects that 
are meant to assist a country in market access 
opportunities and overall economic development. 
A Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme 
(JITAP) which was a capacity building and 
strengthening programme meant to assist eight 
African countries integrate into the MTS through 
trade negotiations, implementation of WTO 
agreements and related trade policy formulation 
although successful in its implementation in 
Malawi did not attain its desired results. The 
project did not consider sustainable issues at the 
time of its implementation and as such almost all 
Reference Centres and National Enquiry Points on 
TBT, SPS and TRIPS that were established during 
the programme’s four year period from 2003 
are no longer fully operational due to budgetary 
constraints.
Conclusion
AfT is an effective tool in helping developing 
countries particularly LDCs to fully benefit from 
trade liberalisation and WTO agreements. Success 
stories have been cited in both African and other 
countries which indicate that the AfT initiative is 
assisting some countries to fully participate and 
take advantage of market access opportunities 
available through MTS. AfT effectiveness is 
however dependent on many variables including 
the ownership of the initiative by all stakeholders 
and ensuring that projects implemented as part 
of the initiative are sustainable after their initial 
donor funded periods. 
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WTO Public Forum discussed the future of 
multilateral trading system
Representatives from civil society, academia, 
business, government, and the media flocked 
to the WTO’s Geneva headquarters this week 
for discussions centred on the future of the 
multilateral trading system. Talks at the 19-21 
September meetings were organised around 
this year’s Public Forum theme, “seeking 
answers to global trade challenges.”
The events, which drew 1500 registered 
participants, were divided into four sub-
themes: food security, made-in-the-world and 
value added trade, trade in natural resources, 
and the future of the multilateral trading 
system. The various panels covered a broad 
spectrum of issues, ranging from access to 
medicines to the implications of the Arab 
Spring on the trade world to lessons learned 
from preferential trading agreements.
The struggles facing the Doha Round of trade 
talks - and the potential implications of the 
current impasse for the WTO as a whole - were 
not lost on either the audience or the panelists, 
especially in light of the uncertainty caused 
by the global financial crisis. Nonetheless, 
participants largely remained upbeat and 
focused on a multiplicity of issues facing the 
WTO and the system more broadly.
WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, in a one-
on-one interview at the forum with Zeinab 
Badawi, presenter of the BBC’s World News 
Today, rebuffed notions that the Doha Round 
was dead. “It’s not an animal. International 
negotiations are in a category where the notion 
of life and death is a bit different, which is 
why the analogy with a living organism may be 
misleading.”
Lamy also addressed some of the concerns 
about the growing proliferation of preferential 
trade agreements, and whether these could 
cause harm to the multilateral trading system. 
“I don’t think we can afford a fragmentation 
of world trade through bilateral regulatory 
approaches,” he told Badawi, alluding to 
the fear that “deeper” preferential trading 
agreements - those that go beyond border 
measures - could create a “spaghetti bowl” 
effect of overlapping regulatory regimes.
Preferential trade agreements, featured in 
various panels throughout the three-day 
gathering, whether with regards to intellectual 
property rights provisions, regulatory 
coherence, or stumbling blocks for a proposed 
trans-Pacific agreement.
Against a backdrop of an ailing global 
economy, a deadlocked Doha trade deal, 
and high and volatile global food prices, the 
relationship between farm trade and food 
security was a recurring theme at this year’s 
Public Forum. 
“Made in the world is the world today,” Lamy 
told the audience at the inaugural session, 
underscoring the growth in global value chains 
in recent years. The implications of this shift 
featured in a variety of sessions, touching on 
issues such as rules of origin, the impact of the 
growing proliferation of bilateral agreements, 
and even the connection of global value chains 
with climate change.
Various discussions at the forum also touched 
on the need to move past market access 
concerns in order to counter the adverse 
effects of climate change. Intellectual property 
rights also surfaced in several of the event 
discussions, particularly with regards to 
innovation and access to medicines, along 
with creating debate on whether stronger 
intellectual property rights were related to 
increased or decreased growth in high and low 
income countries.
More information
Further details on the Public Forum are 
available here
G-20 proposal seeks to prevent extreme 
hunger in West Africa
A leaked proposal on a regional system of 
reserves, which was prepared by the UN World 
Food Programme (WFP) for the Group of 
20 leading economies, has laid out how the 
Economic Community Of West African States 
(ECOWAS) could react to prevent the worst 
cases of hunger. Finance and development co-
operation ministers from the G-20 economies 
discussed the document this past week on the 
margins of the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) Annual Meetings in 
Washington.
The proposed reserves would be strategically 
planted in four locations - Burkina Faso, Ghana, 
Mali, and Senegal - with a mix of inland and 
sea port placement. The system could supply 
ECOWAS with physical reserves for 30 days, 
or 67,000 metric tons of grains, and would 
be supplemented with an additional 60 days 
of virtual reserves for a 90 day total. The WFP 
estimates an initial US$44 million in setup costs 
and US$16 million per year in upkeep.
An NGO source close to the talks in 
Washington told Bridges that it seems unclear 
how supportive ministers actually were of the 
proposal.
The proposal emerges from a tussle between 
those arguing for an expansive food reserves 
system that stabilises prices and those in favour 
of a small and targeted system used only for 
humanitarian ends with a minimal impact on 
markets. Calling the proposal a “remarkable 
tour de force,” Stuart Clark of the Canadian 
Foodgrains Bank told Bridges that there was 
“pressure on designers to keep the reserve as 
small as possible.”
Funding for the reserves system will be a critical 
issue. Neither the G-20 ministerial declarations 
nor the WFP proposal explain how or where 
the resources required will be gathered. Clark 
of the Canadian Foodgrains Bank noted that 
US$33 million out of the US$44 million setup 
cost was for food commodities and speculated 
that G-20 member food aid programmes, such 
as the American USPL 480 or others, would be 
able to contribute in kind or financially.
ECOWAS will be bringing together experts on 
reserves in Dakar, Senegal next week to discuss 
the technical details of the already extensive 
proposal.
See full article here
Panel Rules US ‘Dolphin Safe’ Label Too 
Trade Restrictive
The US’ “dolphin safe” labeling practice for 
tuna products have been deemed WTO illegal, 
according to a ruling issued on Thursday 8 
September. The panel ruled that the label - 
which is meant to inform consumers on the 
use of dolphin-friendly fishing practices - was 
unnecessarily trade restrictive. However, 
the three-member panel disagreed with 
the complainant Mexico that the label also 
discriminated against Mexican tuna on the 
basis of nationality.
At the core of the dispute is the US policy 
of disallowing “dolphin-safe” labels on tuna 
caught in the eastern Pacific Ocean with 
“purse-seine” nets - encircling nets which can 
frequently ensnare unwanted marine life such 
as dolphins in addition to those targeted - 
which are used by Mexican fisheries.
Mexico claimed that the labeling practice has 
the effect of blocking Mexican tuna from the 
US market. Washington, in turn, has rejected 
the claim, stating that its labeling rules do 
not discriminate against Mexican products, 
as the label is available to all tuna products 
independent of their origin. 
Mexico City also argued that the label was 
unnecessarily trade restrictive and that the US 
failed to comply with relevant international 
agreements.
See more information here
WTO Round Up 
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EPA Negotiations: The honeymoon is over…
The European Commission finally announced 
on 30 September 2011 that countries that have 
concluded an Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA) but not taken the necessary steps to ratify 
and implement it would no longer benefit from 
the EPA market access to Europe as from 1st 
January 2014. It concerns 18 island countries 
from the 36 ACP countries, which will have to 
sign and start implementing their existing EPA 
or conclude a new regional EPA. If not, either 
they will fall under one of the schemes of the 
new GSP or they will have no preferences (as 
might be the case for Botswana and Namibia). 
This comes as no surprise. Putting a deadline 
could open the way for a new impetus to the 
current negotiations towards the conclusion of 
regional EPAs. But it could well turn out to be a 
guillotine if no flexibility is provided to advance 
the negotiations. Expect a bumpy ride in the 
coming months…
Read full article by I.Ramdoo and S.Bilal here 
and the main features of the proposal here.
EAC and EC plan way forward in negotiations 
Senior officials and permanent secretaries of 
the East African Community (EAC) and of the 
European Commission (EC) met in Zanzibar on 
15 September 2011 to discuss the outcomes of 
the 9th EAC-EC EPA negotiations session held 
from 12 to 14 September. The parties agreed on 
a joint roadmap to guide the negotiations up to 
December 2011.1
With regard to the provisions on development 
cooperation, parties agreed to use the 2008 
joint Economic and Development Cooperation 
text as a basis of negotiation and revise it and 
scheduled a joint EAC-EC technical meeting 
in mid-November to discuss the development 
matrix that the EAC agreed to submit by the 
end of October. 
Other joint EAC-EU expert intersession meetings 
should also be held in November. One meeting 
will focus on the agriculture text that was 
submitted by the EAC to the EU over the 
summer 2011; another will be on the revised 
draft protocol on the rules of origins, including 
cumulation provisions, that was submitted 
by the EC in July 2011. The EAC also agreed 
to submit a draft text on dispute settlement 
and institutional arrangement by the end of 
October.  
All these issues (development cooperation, rules 
of origins, agriculture and dispute settlement) 
shall be discussed at the next joint technical and 
senior level negotiating session in December in 
Brussels, as well as outstanding issues such as 
the MFN clause, export taxes, environment and 
sustainable development questions. 
EU Trade Commissioner intervenes to advance 
SADC EPA negotiations 
South African leaders and the EU Trade 
Commissioner met in Kruger National Park on 
15 September to review the state of play of 
the EU-SADC  (Southern African Development 
Community) EPA negotiations.2  
Ahead of the summit, the EU Trade 
Commissioner, Karel De Gucht, met with South 
African Trade Minister Rob Davies to discuss 
the EU-SADC EPA negotiations. Prior to that, 
De Gucht met Namibian President Hifikepunye 
Pohamba and key ministers, as well as Namibian 
business representatives and civil society, in 
Windhoek to discuss Namibia’s concerns with 
regard to the EPAs.3 “We have taken stock 
of the EPA negotiations and cleared up some 
important misunderstandings that could have 
been a hindrance to signing,” said De Gucht. 
De Gucht was also reportedly confident that 
outstanding issues, such as preferential access 
for Namibia’s fisheries products that are 
sourced beyond the internationally accepted 12 
nautical mile territorial zone and the ambivalent 
status of its canning industry, could be solved. 
Namibia’s Minister of Fisheries, Bernhardt Esau, 
agrees, “There is an understanding that we 
can resolve the remaining issues as soon as 
possible.”
Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) EPA Group technical and senior 
officials met from 31 August to 3 September 
in Johannesburg to prepare the next technical 
level EPA negotiating session.  SADC officials 
discussed market access issues such as the 
administration of cumulation, products to be 
excluded from diagonal cumulation in the 
EU, the fishery issues of Namibia, SACU – EU 
Tariff negotiations and products excluded 
from standstill. There were also discussions on 
unresolved issues as well as trade related issues. 
Senior Officials agreed to delay the engagement 
of the SADC EPA Trade Ministers until after 
negotiations with the EU. 
Pacific Leaders give EPA top priority
Pacific ACP leaders meeting in Auckland on 
6 September called for continued all-regional 
negotiations on a comprehensive EPA with 
the EU and endorsed the revised EPA roadmap 
establishing the EPA negotiations as top 
priority for the region in 2012.4 Lead Pacific 
EPA spokesperson, Tongan Trade Minister 
Lisiate ‘Akolo reported that the region has 
made substantial progress in finalising a 
regional position on the draft Pacific ACP-EU 
EPA text as well as finalising market access 
offers for eight Pacific ACP States (Cook 
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, 
Niue, Palau, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu) – 
market access offers that remain conditional 
on the resolution of the contentious issues 
such as the global sourcing  rules of origin for 
fresh and frozen fish.5 
Pacific ACP leaders called for an independent 
regional body, other than the Pacific Islands 
Forum Secretariat (the capacity of which they 
criticise), to assist Pacific ACP States in their 
EPA negotiations with the EU and other related 
work. They also endorsed the convening of an 
Eminent Persons Group to discuss the issue 
of the management of Pacific ACP issues. The 
PIFS will remain in charge of EPA negotiations 
during the deliberations of the Eminent 
Persons. 
The head of the Pacific’s Office of the Chief 
Trade Advisor, Chris Noonan, resigned 
immediately prior to the Pacific ACP leaders 
meeting, citing personal reasons.6 The OCTA 
provides independent advice and technical 
support to Forum Island Countries in the 
PACER Plus negotiations with Australia and 
New Zealand. It is no secret however that he 
has struggled to ensure the independence of 
this office. There have been calls from Pacific 
ACP leaders to extend OCTA’s mandate to 
EPAs. 
No information on Central Africa and West 
Africa 
TNI is not able to confirm that the Central 
African regional consultations scheduled in 
September were held, nor is it able to confirm 
that the ECOWAS Ministerial Monitoring 
Committee on EPAs scheduled in September 
took place.
ESA EPA meetings postponed
The EU-ESA (Eastern and Southern Africa) 
meetings tentatively scheduled from 26-30 
September have been postponed. 
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Vacancy: Chief Trade Adviver - Office of the Chief Trade Adviser 
The Office of the Chief Trade Adviser (OCTA) provides independent advice and support to 
the Pacific Forum Island Countries (FICs) in PACER Plus negotiations with Australia and New 
Zealand. It is based in Port Vila, Vanuatu. 
The OCTA is seeking to appoint a suitably qualified and experienced Chief Trade Adviser 
(CTA). The CTA will be reporting to the OCTA Governing Board.
The CTA will be accountable for the overall management, operation, performance and 
leadership of the OCTA; providing timely, high quality analytical advice in areas relevant to 
PACER Plus activities and negotiations and other areas as instructed by the FICs; representation 
of the FICs as directed; building the capacity and facilitating capacity building in the FICs; 
assisting the FICs in the negotiation process; organising and facilitating the meetings of the FICs 
and the Governing Board; and coordinating and promoting cooperation among the FICs, and 
with other relevant stakeholders.
Applicants should have an advanced university degree with substantial relevant experience 
in negotiating trade agreements at a technical level, detailed knowledge of regional trade 
relations between developed and developing countries and relevant WTO agreements. Extensive 
knowledge of and / or experience in the Pacific Region is expected.
Previous managerial experience in leading an organisation and/or a team of professionals, and 
experience in public communication and dealing with the media will be beneficial. Experiences 
in advising governments at the senior level, in supporting or being part of developing countries’ 
delegations in trade negotiations are highly desirable.  Extensive experience in policy analysis 
and report writing will be positively considered. Strong leadership, managerial, communication 
and team skills will be expected. 
The position will carry a competitive remuneration package. Applicants should be willing to 
travel economy class. More detailed job description can be requested from Ms Loreen Ala-
Ngwele, Administration Manager, at info@octapic.org or tel: (+678) 25003. 
Visit http://www.octapic.org/about-us/working-us/ for more information.
Applications should be addressed to the Office of the Chief Trade Adviser, Independence Park, 
P.O. Box 561, Port Vila, Vanuatu and emailed to info@octapic.org clearly indicating ‘Chief 
Trade Adviser Application’ in the subject matter. Applications should be received by close of 
business on Friday 18 October 2011 (extended). 
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Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL COM (2011) 598 amending 
Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 
1528/2007 as regards the exclusion of a 
number of countries from the list of regions 
or states which have concluded negotiations, 
European Commission, September 2011, 
ec.europa.eu 
Memo on access to EU markets for 
exporters from African, Caribbean 
and Pacific countries, September 2011, 
European Commission Directorate General 
for Trade, ec.europa.eu/trade 
To prepare an EU position in view of 
UNCTAD XIII Conference, Commission 
Staff Working Paper, SEC(2011) 1030 final, 
September 2011, ec.europa.eu
Food Reserves in Developing Countries: 
Trade Policy Options for Improved 
Food Security by Christopher L. Gilbert, 
ICTSD, September 2011, http://ictsd.org/i/
publications/114284/ 
Improving the International Governance 
of Food Security and Trade by Manzoor 
Ahmad, ICTSD, September 2011, http://ictsd.
org/i/publications/114288/
Leaked post-2013 EU Common 
Agricultural Policy Proposals, ICTSD, 
September 2011, www.ictsd.org 
 
The Trade Impact of European Union 
Preferential Policies, De Benedictis, Luca; 
Salvatici, Luca (Eds.), 2011
Economic Partnership Agreements 
and African Regional Integration: 
Have negotiations helped or hindered 
regional integration? International Food & 
Agricultural Trade Policy Council & GMF Issue 
Brief, August 2011, www.gmfus.org 
Trade Facilitation in the COMESA-EAC-
SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area, Mark 
Pearson, TRALAC working paper, September 
2011, www.tralac.org  
Promoting African Trade and Regional 
Integration: The Tripartite FTA and the 
Role of Development Corridors, Greg 
Gajewski, GMF Policy Brief, August 2011, 
www.gmfus.org
Trade Facilitation Indicators: The Impact 
on Trade Costs, Evdokia Moïsé, Thomas 
Orliac, Peter Minor, OECD Trade Policy 
Working Paper nr 118, August 2011,  
www.oecd-ilibrary.org 
Who Benefits from Regional Trade 
Agreements? The View from the Stock 
Market, Christopher Moser, Andrew K. Rose, 
NBER Working Paper No. 17415, September 
2011, http://papers.nber.org/ 
The financial crisis and international 
trade: the consequences for developing 
countries, Katrin Berensmann, Clara Brandi, 
DIE Briefing Paper 13, September 2011, 
www.die-gdi.de  
 
China and Africa: an Emerging 
Partnership for Development? Richard 
Schiere, Leonce Ndikumana and Peter 
Walkenhorst (eds.), www.afdb.org 
Harnessing trade for development in 
least-developed countries, World Trade 
Organisation, 2011, www.wto.org 
Firm Location and the Determinants 
of Exporting in Developing Countries, 
Thomas Farole, Deborah Winkler, World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 5780, August 
2011, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/   
MFN in the CARIFORUM - EC Economic 
Partnership Agreement: Policy Blunder or 
Legal Inconsistency? Claude S. K. Chase, 
Legal Issues of Economic Integration Vol. 
38(2), 2011  
TRALAC annual conference report, 
TRALAC, September 2011, www.tralac.org
Africa’s Pulse: An analysis of the Issues 
shaping Africa’s Future, The World Bank, 
Africa’s Pulse Vol.4, September 2011, http://
blogs.worldbank.org/
UNCTAD launches the World Investment report 
2011: http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/111341/
UNCTAD Trade and Development report 
2011 highlights global post crisis policy 
challenges http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.
asp?symbol=A/66/185&Lang=E
Release of the Global Competitiveness report 
2011-2012: http://reports.weforum.org/global-
competitiveness-2011-2012/
 
 
Statement by Commissioner for Trade Karel 
De Gucht on Doha Development Agenda: 
See full speech at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/59
4&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLa
nguage=en
South Africa – EU summit held on 15 
September 2011: http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/59
4&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLa
nguage=en
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 October
17-20 Meeting of the heads of 
ACP Regional Economic 
Communities 
TBC EU-SADC EPA technical and 
senior officials meeting (venue 
TBC)
TBC AU-EU Ministerial Meeting, 
Brussels, Belgium
TBC West Africa meeting of the 
sub-group on Rules of Origins 
(venue TBC)
TBC ESA EPA group a Council 
meeting, Malawi 
 November
3-4 G20 Summit, Cannes, France
7-11 West Africa technical level 
meeting on EPA (venue TBC)
21-23 22nd session of the ACP-EU 
Joint Parliamentary Assembly, 
Freetown, Sierra Leone
 
 
 
 
ACP-EU Events WTO Events
29 – 1  4th High Level Forum on aid
effectiveness, Busan, Korea
TBC  Pacific-EU negotiating session 
on EPA, Brussels, Belgium
TBC  Joint EAC-EC technical 
meeting to discuss the EAC 
Development Matrix 
TBC  EAC Summit of Heads of 
State
 December
15-16 European Development Days, 
Warsaw, Poland 
TBC ACP-EU EPA Joint Ministerial 
Trade Committee meeting, 
Brussels, Belgium 
TBC Joint EU-EAC technical and 
senior negotiations, Brussels, 
Belgium 
 October
19 + 21 Trade Policy Review Body - Zimbabwe 
21  Working Group on Standards and Trade 
Development Facility
24   Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices 
25  Council for Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights
25  Dispute Settlement Body
26 -27 General Council 
27  Committee on Rules of Origin Fax
